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Abstract 
 
The most critical aviation system is the human operator in the cockpit of modern 
aircraft.  Regardless of the advancements in microelectronics and automated decision-
making apparatus, the human will still remain ultimately responsible for the safety of 
those in the air and on the ground.  Humans, however, are not entirely predictable or 
consistent when functioning in this capacity.  The relationship between crewmembers 
becomes a critical aspect of this system, and this paper focuses on methods to improve 
both individual and especially crew decision-making in aviation.  Concepts and structure 
from the Navy’s Crew Resource Management program are used as the background for 
discussion.  Initially, the individual is examined, followed by an assessment of the 
physical systems in the cockpit, and finally methods for improving human interaction are 
discussed.   
To understand how decisions (whether good or bad) are made, an examination of 
the inputs to the human decision maker is required.  The methods people use to evaluate 
their environment and choose a course of action will be discussed, as well as the effects 
of culture and experience on this process.  The physical information and control systems 
of an aircraft will be briefly reviewed, and suggestions for improving the efficacy of the 
information provided and aircrew employment will be offered.  Finally, the 
interrelationship between humans involved in the system will be studied, including 
suggested means to facilitate and improve these interactions.  The intent is to provide 
insight to the human team and methods to improve decision making in the modern 
cockpit.   
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1.  BACKGROUND 
 
The human being is the most important system in the modern cockpit.  Computers 
have evolved fantastically, but nothing can match the ability of a human to process large 
volumes of disparate data, recognize trends and patterns, and adapt to rapidly changing 
environments and demands.  Humans are fallible, however, and subject to make mistakes 
when surveying the environment and in making the subsequent necessary decisions.  
Because of this, the person in the cockpit is still the single most critical and complex 
system in an airplane.  Automated decisions are more prevalent in modern systems, but 
none are robust enough to be solely responsible for the lives of hundreds of people riding 
inside the machine.  So, humans are and will remain a decision-making component of any 
aircraft, especially one carrying passengers.  The challenge is to improve the decisions 
made by aircrew.  No system is perfect; improvements are always possible.  This is the 
focus of this paper: to improve the decisions made by aircrew in the execution of their 
duties.  Traditional methods of United States Naval Aviation will be used as the 
foundation for discussion, but the potential (and hoped for) application includes not only 
the entire Navy but commercial aviation and industry as well.  The techniques will 
explore both the man-machine interfaces and human interactions that provide the source 
of information necessary to make intelligent choices in the cockpit.  A sample of 
historical aviation accidents will show that there is much room for improvement in this 
area.   
Aircraft are not designed to fail, nor are aircrew trained to crash airplanes.  Thus, 
all aviation mishaps are attributable, at some level, to human error.  But during the 100 
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years of powered flight, technology and oversight has progressively pushed human error 
toward the end-state user, those manipulating the controls and pressing the buttons.  As 
the aviation community, including U. S. Naval Aviation, came to realize this, emphasis 
was placed on the mitigation of operator error.  The initial Navy attempt to affect aircrew 
interaction was begun as Aircrew Coordination Training, and was started several years 
behind the commercial industry’s version of the same.  Later, in an effort to model the 
airline’s increasingly effective programs, the Naval term was changed to Crew Resource 
Management.  These curricula emphasized that errors were due primarily to a failure to 
“play nice with others”: aircrew failed to “coordinate” with each other or to use all of the 
available “resources” to develop solutions to in-flight problems.  These programs have 
proven beneficial, but each lacked a model of decision-making and missing were any 
rules for the application of the concepts proffered.  This paper seeks to address those 
shortcomings, and to generalize the technique of mitigating operator error so that it may 
be applied in any situation involving complex mechanisms interacting with humans. 
The critical skill sought among these operators is not just “coordination” or 
“resource management” – these are elements aircrew employ to harmoniously and 
effectively make team decisions.  So, a better and more encompassing term is Team 
Decision Making.  For simplicity of discussion, emphasis will remain on aviation and the 
aircrew’s role in Team Decision Making.  As the senior pilot’s title on any flight deck 
implies, the aircrew are the “Captains” or the coaches in the aviation team.  Just as a 
coach scouts for potential effective members of a team, so must aircrew function as 
coaches – ever vigilant for potential contributors to their awareness.  So too, as a coach 
will cull ineffective or detrimental members of a team, the aircrew must reject 
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information deemed to be invalid or misleading.  Unlike sports, teams in aviation will be 
built and dissolved in moments, as every exchange may bring a new member in the form 
of a tower controller, a passing ground maintenance technician who sees a missing 
fastener, etc.  Constants will be present, too, in the form of instruments and displays, but 
a failure to understand the capabilities and limitations of these items, as in chess and its 
pieces, can result in tragic failure.  Aircrew are the coaches and captains of a very 
dynamic team, ultimately responsible for the lives of millions each year, and their 
decisions must be founded on a cast of players whose effectiveness is determined by the 
cohesion and consensus that is built on the strengths of their skills.  Following are 
suggestions for improving those skills. 
 
Why?  Because in Naval Aviation, based on 1,000 hours of flying, the odds are: 
 
  1 of 25 fighter/attack aviators will crash 
  1 of 71 fighter/attack aviators will be killed 
  1 of 59 helicopter aviators will crash 
  1 of 177 helicopter aviators will be killed (NSC, 2001) 
 
Reason enough to improve our decisions… 
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2.  TEAM DECISION MAKING 
 
2.1 Objective Statement 
Team Decision Making, or TDM, requires the knowledge of how we, as human 
beings, make decisions.  Then, TDM becomes the art of improving those decisions 
through the use of specific methods and techniques to relate to and recruit information 
from fellow humans and machines. 
2.2 Risk Management   
Team Decision Making, or TDM, is the logical evolution of Aircrew 
Coordination Training and Crew Resource Management.  TDM addresses the occurrence 
of risk in real-time – the attempt to reduce operator error by involving all assets in the 
decision making process.  It would be even better, though, to never face the specter of 
operator error.  By planning evolutions to avoid exposure to risk, the need for TDM is 
reduced.  This is risk management via planning.  Traditionally, the United States Navy 
has employed planned risk management techniques not only in aviation but also in all 
operational areas.  The broad-brush technique is termed “ORM” or “Operational Risk 
Management”.  This concept addresses only planned risk, and is an effort to consciously 
acknowledge activities that contain an inherently higher chance of a mishap occurring.   
The U.S. Navy currently has a healthy and well-developed ORM program.  The 
term ORM should actually include the current technique of risk planning as well as 
aspects of TDM, since risk management involves the mitigation techniques of 
forethought and the application of real-time containment methods.  All members of the 
service are required to accomplish annual risk planning training and some areas, 
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including Naval Aviation, use daily risk screening forms to force individuals and the 
command into awareness of the dangers present (see appendix for an example of a risk 
assessment worksheet).  While this accomplishes the critical role of highlighting the 
potential for errors and accidents to occur, it fails to address what to do when, in the 
course of executing the mission, they actually happen.  Too, no matter how creative the 
person is who devises the screening form or how long a crewmember spends 
brainstorming the possibilities, unforeseen circumstances will always arise.  To deny this 
eventuality would be to assume a “zero defects” mentality of operations – which would 
be unwise and quite counterproductive.  A healthy organization must accept that human 
error will occur, and cannot blindly punish inadvertent mistakes.  This does not, however, 
mean that an organization should be resigned to expecting eventual catastrophes, as the 
goal of risk management is to avoid just that. 
To effectively manage risk in modern Naval operations, training on the subject 
must include a “troika” theory - reducing the likelihood of error, trapping errors before 
they have an operational effect, and mitigating the consequences of errors when they do 
occur (Hayward, 1997).  ORM is the appropriate title for this effort.  Risk planning 
concerns the effort to reduce the likelihood of error though avoidance, while Team 
Decision Making is designed to aid in trapping errors and countering the effects once 
errors do occur.  This triumvirate is required: consider risk management as a three-legged 
table - without each leg the table will not stand.  An organization cannot expect that 
effective planning will eliminate all risk, nor can one afford not to survey and avoid the 
threats present in a given endeavor.  After accepting that errors are inherent in all 
activities, methods of containing and limiting human mistakes among the operators are 
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necessary, but if the upset comes from outside the organization’s control, then plans must 
exist to smoothly handle the disturbance.  This handling of errors in real-time could also 
be termed immediate risk management. 
 Although the entire U.S. Navy addresses planned risk management, currently only 
Naval Aviation consciously trains personnel in immediate risk management.  As 
mentioned, this program is termed Crew Resource Management, or CRM, and has been 
in place for over ten years.  Immediate risk management could also be termed “improved 
team decision-making” or “crew based minimization of error”, as this concept seeks to 
reduce the impact of errors once committed and aid in guiding teams toward healthy 
decisions.  The Navy’s CRM program attempts to do so using seven skills: “Situational 
Awareness”, “Adaptability/Flexibility”, “Decision Making”, “Communication”, 
“Leadership”, “Assertiveness” and “Mission Analysis”.  Combined into an acronym, they 
are best memorized as “SAD CLAM.”  CRM defines each of these “skills” as an aid to 
help the crew handle various negative situations.  Current theory holds that each of these 
skills is a relatively independent element capable of being employed with or without the 
others.  This is not the case: the skills are interrelated, and in some cases cannot exist 
except as part of a sequence of mental processes.  Some require the presence of another 
human; some do not.  Under the theory of Team Decision Making, the “SAD” portion of 
the seven skills defines a discrete process that nearly every human uses to make decisions 
in life.  “CLAM” becomes a set of personal interaction skills that can be used to define 
and improve human interfaces.  Both of these processes will be addressed in detail, but 
considering the complexities of human beings, it is appropriate to begin with the basic 
elements of this decision-making system. 
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2.3  The Elements of the System 
Often a system is best analyzed by studying its components.  This method is 
appropriate in the cockpit, as the informational and decision-making system consists of 
three basic components.  There is the flight crew, seeking information and awareness of 
their environment, the instruments and electronic/mechanical systems supplying some of 
that information, and other humans, external to the cockpit but a part of the aviation team 
nonetheless.  This is the basic functional division of cockpit, and although computers 
have begun to usurp the role of the human in making decisions, the aircrew still must 
verify the correct operation of any automation.  From this outline, the study of how 
decisions are made in the modern cockpit should consider the role of each of these three 
elements separately before attempting a comprehensive review.  Because it is possible for 
decisions to be made by an individual, without any input from instruments or other 
people, the psyche of the human is the logical starting point for this discussion. 
Although the members of an aircrew should strive to function as a cohesive 
whole, any given flight deck team is certainly composed of individuals.  Unlike 
mechanical systems, each person does not conform to a rigid set of specifications.  This is 
both good and bad; to realize the reasons, a detailed examination of the mental processes 
of the crewmembers is necessary.  Although human cognitive function is similar and 
often conforms to predictable norms, there is significant variety in the mental processes 
of each individual.  Aviation typically tries to reduce the variables in this regime, by 
carefully screening potential candidates and then exhaustively training each to ensure at 
least a superficial conformance to established standards.  Regular examinations and 
training events help to reinforce this attempt to model behavior.  But, when unusual 
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situations arise, or when excessive stress is present, the persons involved will likely 
revert to the norms learned while younger or those reinforced over the longest period of 
time (Baxter, 1998).  Thus, it is important to analyze the cognition, especially the art of 
decision-making, based on not just aviation standards but on the more basic level of 
general human reasoning.  As such, the individual and his or her method of decision-
making is a critical element of the cockpit system. 
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3.  THE INDIVIDUAL HUMAN 
 
3.1  Levels of Human Performance 
Decisions are made and actions taken on one of three basic levels of human 
performance.  A person reacts to a scenario at either a skill-based, rule-based or 
knowledge-based level (Reason, 1997/Rasmussen, 1986).  These descriptions refer to the 
amount of conscious effort required to elect a course of action.  Through experience and 
training, given preconditions elicit predictable responses – skill-based actions.  If, 
however, there is less empirical knowledge of an event, humans must increasingly rely on 
conscious analysis, progressing from rule to knowledge-based actions.  The amount of 
subconscious, or automatic, functioning depends on the level of training or experience 
with a scenario.  These divisions are important in determining how a team works 
together: since their level of training and experience will always vary, so will their level 
of performance in similar situations. 
3.1.1  Skill Based Tasks 
Skill-based tasks rely on training for the automatic execution of regular tasks 
under given stimuli.  Repetitive work is an example of skill-based execution, where an 
assembly-line worker might become numb to the task, repeatedly doing the same actions 
over and over again.  Little if any conscious effort is required in this instance, and in fact 
mental processes often wander outside the focus of the work at hand, simply because the 
attention is underutilized during such tasking.  Under less persistent conditions, though, 
skill-based tasks may allow other conscious operations to occur.  The act of driving to 
work is, after some experience, a skill based task – the existence of spare mental capacity 
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can be seen in the many drivers on the road engaged in talking on cell phones, attempting 
to read, applying makeup, or any number of activities which require greater mental 
attention than the often practiced mission of driving.  Skill based tasks require 
reinforcement and are subject to degradation with time – exactly the reason a gymnast 
practices daily.  In aviation, checklists and scripted procedures also facilitate this type of 
action:    
 
This scripted approach to operating procedures has major advantages. Crews must 
often accomplish a very large number of procedural steps in a short time.  
Scripting allows pilots to perform procedural tasks consistently in line operations 
so that performance becomes largely automatic with practice; execution is fluid 
and rapid and requires little mental effort. (Loukopoulos, et al. 2003). 
 
A skill-based reaction, however, can occur automatically (as it should) when 
one’s Situational Awareness (SA) is incorrect.  This can be a deadly response, so the 
tendency for crewmembers to allow trained reactions to occur should be tempered with 
the crew’s confidence in their assessment of the environment.  If there are unknown 
elements, skill-based reactions should be inhibited and treated as conscious acts by the 
crew to avoid inadvertently wrong reactions.  It is critical that the necessary skills be 
trained correctly and positive actions reinforced.  Even minor mistakes should be 
corrected, because these could potentially serve as the critical links in an eventual chain 
of mistakes leading to catastrophe.  A jet fighter was once lost when a pilot attempted to 
shut an engine down using a switch designed to cut fuel in case of fire.  The engine was 
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stuck at high power, and normal methods of securing the throttle were not working.  The 
wrong switch was activated, even though this action was practiced repeatedly in training 
and simulation – a skill based task.  The error was not recognized, and the aircraft ran out 
of fuel before landing. 
The saying “you fight like you train” is common in the military, and its meaning 
is simple:  the habits built during less stressful training exercises determine the automatic 
responses and unconscious actions taken when a person is confronted with an 
overwhelming situation.  In reality, training does even more.  Training scenarios, if even 
somewhat realistic, build impressions of how events will unfold in reality.  This actually 
creates models in the memory of the aircrew, which they will expect reality to follow.  
Even if an actual event differs from the presentation in a simulation, the aircrew will 
attempt to force the cues and indicators to conform to the model developed in their 
training.  This can be dangerous, as it can easily lead to a misdiagnosis of a problem.  
Many simulator sessions, and some flights, end in disaster when someone declares “I’ve 
seen this before” and hastily concludes the wrong diagnosis.  This tendency for humans 
to interpret scenarios in relation to their experience will be discussed shortly. 
Skill-based tasks, though, are the ones most familiar to a person.  For example, at 
the skill-based level, the pilot is subconsciously aware that pulling aft on the control stick 
of an airplane causes the nose to rise and the airplane to climb.  This action-reaction 
pairing is reinforced from the first moment a pilot takes the controls of an aircraft, and is 
reinforced every time the controls are manipulated.  When the pilot becomes aware of a 
need to climb, the motor skills required to accomplish this happen automatically and 
without conscious thought.  This occurs due to years of training and conditioning 
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accompanied by regular practice, since this skill is required anytime an aircraft is flown.  
Without regular reinforcement, skills can degrade, causing the operator to “think about” 
the task at hand.  In this case, rule-based performance may occur. 
3.1.2  Rule Based Tasks 
Rule-based tasks involve cognitive as well as subconscious actions.  Situations 
typically are not frequent enough for an aircrew to develop learned and automatic 
responses, yet some level of training has existed and there is familiarity with the scenario 
and the expected outcome.  In this type of action, feedback is normally a required 
element in order to determine the efficacy of the decision.  In rule-based decision making, 
sufficient data has been collected to build a model of the system and to establish causal 
relationships between events and outcomes.  Essentially, “…rules provide a means for 
multiple people to explicitly represent their collective wisdom” (Kaliardos, 1999). 
An abundance of rules exist in aviation.  There are the imposed, confining rules 
that limit an aircrew’s actions, but rules also exist to describe the regime of flight and 
establish standards of actions and reactions.  One hundred years of practical research in 
powered flight has produced a plethora of rules that define the art of flying.  Typically, 
aircraft and the atmosphere conform to these norms, allowing aircrew to study the rules 
and apply them to make rational decisions regarding flight.  When practice is insufficient 
to elicit an automatic response, an aircrew must make mental reference to the training and 
collective experience of aviation – the “rules”.  For rules to exist, however, there must be 
either corporate knowledge of the situation or else research into the theoretical realm; in 
either case, the scenario must be foreseen.  Too, the rules may be based on incomplete 
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facts or faulty assumptions, rendering them invalid.  This logically leads to the next level 
of decision making: knowledge-based tasks.   
At the rule-based level, a pilot might desire to climb, but when the control stick is 
pulled aft the nose rises but the aircraft does not climb.  This then invokes rule-based 
reasoning, and the pilot will examine the situation to determine the failure of the aircraft 
to climb.  Rules specify that the aircraft will not climb in this situation if insufficient 
power is applied or if angle-of-attack is excessive, and so the pilot might begin a process 
of elimination to determine which rule is required to produce a climb.  Limited cognition 
is necessary to discover that, perhaps, power is required to climb.  Without the existence 
of a rule specifying this, then much greater mental effort, and probably a process of trial 
and error, would be needed.   
3.1.3  Knowledge Based Tasks 
Knowledge-based tasks require intimate cognition by the decision maker, and 
thus hopefully by the entire team.  Knowledge-based reasoning occurs once rules have 
failed or when a situation transcends corporate experience.   
An excellent example of a knowledge-based task is historical medicine, where 
typical doctors were expected to be very familiar with theory, but not necessarily have 
the experience to automatically generate a diagnosis and treatment.  Feedback was 
critical to the doctor’s task, as the results of initial treatment determined follow-on 
procedures.  Trial-and-error was typical, and without any formal cause-effect 
relationships documented, incorrect assumptions and methods persisted for years.  This is 
the nature of knowledge-based decision making: an unfamiliar environment requires a 
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decision maker to employ aggressive cognitive attention to the task, since he or she must 
determine, based on speculation and feedback, the efficacy of the decision.  In modern 
medicine, however, many doctors are specialized to a high degree.  Past experience has 
been compiled to allow the community the benefit of prior experience, and treatment is 
progressing towards rule, even skill-based execution.   
At the knowledge-based level of action, a pilot might desire to climb in an 
aircraft, and so pull aft on the control stick – but in this case the nose of the aircraft drops 
instead of rising, which is the expected response.  Now the pilot is forced into active 
cognitive reasoning, since skills have produced an unexpected response and rules may 
not exist for a response opposite that expected.  Although the rules discount this 
possibility, perhaps the controls were connected in reverse or an odd aerodynamic 
phenomenon caused the response.  Success now depends on the creativity of the crew in 
deriving a solution using their ability to reason.  Unfortunately, in aviation very strict 
time limits are typically imposed on this brainstorming process! 
3.1.4 Human Performance 
Significantly, aircrew in the same cockpit can be operating at distinctly different 
levels: a flight instructor is likely performing at a skill and rule-based level, while a 
neophyte student is struggling at the rule and knowledge-based level, if not completely 
overwhelmed!  This is vitally important, and must be taken into consideration when 
relating to other crewmembers – the skills of interrelations will be addressed soon.  So, 
from this point forward, let us consider only rule or knowledge based performance.  Skill 
based actions do not require resource and information management.  How the operator 
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assesses the situation, which leads to the subconscious conclusion of which skill to apply, 
most certainly does rely on resource management.  The improvement of rule and 
knowledge-based decisions, and the crew’s awareness regarding their situation (and thus 
the skills applied), is the objective of Team Decision Making.  
Humans make decisions throughout life, of course.  Some decisions carry 
significantly more consequence than others, and are likely to be more carefully 
scrutinized.  The data required to make intelligent choices is sought by most people, and 
the information gained becomes part of the consciousness – the awareness of that 
individual.  As decisions are made and feedback is presented, a person’s appraisal of the 
situation may change.  Whether or not it does often depends on the flexibility and 
willingness of the individual to adapt to dynamic environments.  This quick synopsis of 
events forms the structure of the human decision-making process: humans gain 
awareness of a situation, then, depending on one’s ability to assimilate and react to 
changing information, a revised model may be developed, whereupon a decision is made 
and action taken based on that model.  Feedback is supplied following action, and the 
cycle begins anew.  This sequence of events essentially occurs for every decision a 
person makes throughout life.  
In order to make any decision, humans require information.  There are three 
primary modes by which information is supplied to aircrew: internal – instincts, 
experience and prejudices; the informational systems on an aircraft – the instruments; and 
other humans – air traffic control, copilots, etc. Each of these systems directly affects 
what the aircrew believes is happening around them: their “Situational Awareness”, or 
“SA”.  This awareness affects the aircrew’s actions, as all decisions made are based on 
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the individual SA of each of the crewmembers.  Regardless of what level an individual is 
performing at, there is a continuous quest for information about the state of the 
environment, thus allowing operators to make appropriate decisions. 
3.2  Individual Decision Making 
Before examining the sources of information, and how to improve each of them, 
one must first devise a model of how human decisions are made.  U.S. Air Force Colonel 
John Boyd devised a prescient model he called the “OODA Loop” (USMC, 1992).  The 
principle was that a person Observes a situation, then Orients himself, Decides on a 
course of action, and then Acts to carry it out.  Per his theory, this cycle repeats 
continuously, according to the speed and dynamics of a changing environment.  The 
OODA Loop concept was initially oriented towards warfare, but it has universal 
application in life.  Every human, when faced with a dynamic situation, will follow those 
steps: Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act.  This “OODA Loop” can also be considered a 
“Decision-Making Cycle” (Hammonds, 2002).  To convert the terms into more aviation-
related parlance, terms will be borrowed from the Navy’s Crew Resource Management 
training syllabus.  The “Decision-Making Cycle” can be described using three of the 
Navy’s CRM skills: Situational Awareness, Adaptability / Flexibility, and Decision 
Making.  The steps in the Decision-Making Cycle are shown in figure 1.  In building a 
model for this cycle using these terms, a clear definition of each is required.   
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A Assertiveness 
 
 
D Decision Making 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Elements of Human Decision Making 
(Author) 
 
 
 
3.2.1  Definition of Situational Awareness 
Situational Awareness, or “SA”, is most easily defined as one person’s impression 
of “what is going on”.  It is comprised of all the recognized inputs around that individual: 
hearing, sight, smell, memory, etc.  Humans automatically derive SA from any given 
situation, regardless of any effort not to – it is impossible to avoid developing an opinion 
of a scenario.  A common saying in the military, when referring to someone who is lost 
or confused, is that “he has no SA”.  This is empirically impossible, since a total lack of 
sensory information would be required to leave a person with “no SA”.  What actually 
occurs is that the “clueless” individual has the wrong impression of “what is going on”.  
This is the dangerous situation: when a responsible crewmember misinterprets the 
environment and proceeds to make decisions based on these incorrect perceptions.  So, it 
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is critical that a person’s Situational Awareness be as accurate as possible, to ensure that 
courses of action chosen are based on the true environment.   
 But what defines a “true environment”?  What in life serves as the standard of 
measure for SA?  Unfortunately, there are no absolute references for life’s occurrences.  
There are the strict numbers that serve to define an environment, such as the temperature, 
barometric pressure, etc., but once humans are involved, the definition of circumstances 
is heavily dependent upon the individual.  The world functions because of agreed upon 
standards and measures.  These are used to define the world and allow humans to relate 
under these common restrictions, for without them, each person would utilize individual 
definitions for their observations.  Of course, if an event transcends experience or 
training, then that person is left to apply references that may or may not fit the situation.  
Just such an occurrence happened on the night of June 24, 1982 when a 747 operated by 
British Airways flew into the ash cloud emanating from the eruption of Mt. Galunggung 
on the island of Java (Job, 1996).  Because it was nighttime, the crew had no idea they 
had entered the ash cloud, but the manifestations were alarming to say the least: the 
leading edges of all surfaces began to glow white; the engine exhaust became iridescent 
plumes of fire and the cabin began to fill with smoke.  The crew had no idea what was 
causing these strange effects, and suspected a fire of some sort, when suddenly all four 
engines failed due to contamination from the ash!  The 747 began an unpowered descent 
from 37,000 feet with the crew trying desperately to regain engine power, which they 
finally did at 12,000 feet, after flying out of the bottom of the ash cloud.  Their actions 
were directed by their limited awareness (due to complete inexperience with such a 
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scenario) – had the crew realized the odd effects were due to volcanic ash, they could 
have easily flown back out of the cloud, or avoided it altogether.   
3.2.2  Adaptability / Flexibility 
 The ability of someone to accept and internalize information related to a changing 
situation can be referred to as one’s Adaptability or Flexibility.  This tendency could also 
be described as one’s “internal inertia”.  Because humans tend to expect events to unfold 
based on past experience or expected outcomes, data that contradicts such expectations 
may be ignored or discounted.  Emotions may play into this tendency, as desire or pride 
can induce inflexibility, when persons cling to plans (proven invalid) because of vanity or 
a misplaced sense of mission.  The military refers to a form of this as “get-home-itis”, 
where aircrew accept unsafe aircraft for flight or launch into questionable weather due to 
a desire to complete the mission – often to return home to loved ones after long 
deployments.  The arrangements are not made in consideration of these degrading factors, 
simply because the conditions did not exist when planning.  But when situations change 
and evidence contradicting the plans arises, aircrew are often loath to recognize or accept 
that the schedule must be revised.  Outside observers can easily see the fallacy of 
continuing with the preset preparations, but those involved are blind to the obvious – they 
have become inflexible in the face of revised information.  This inflexibility can be both 
recognized and unrecognized.  In many cases, the data is acknowledged and dismissed, 
other times, the subconscious attempts to prevent conscious involvement and tends to 
mask cognitive assessment of contradicting observations.   
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 Another aspect of adaptability is the presence of high levels of stress.  Under 
dynamic conditions, and with the heavy consequences often present in aviation decisions, 
some people can become paralyzed when facing the fear of making an incorrect decision.  
The different levels of fear and stress are difficult to predict, as most humans avoid 
situations that bring them to such a level of duress.  Because of the human predilection to 
avoid risk and conflict, few have knowledge of the level at which they will cease to 
effectively function.  Thus, aircrew should be trained such that they recognize this point 
in themselves, and, more importantly, in others.  A co-pilot who has “locked-up” and no 
longer contributes to the mission when under stress should be immediately recognizable 
to the other crewmembers, and procedures for circumventing or aiding this person should 
be reviewed.  There is benefit in training aircrew by attempting to take them to this level, 
and simulator training for Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18 pilots typically does just that: 
during annual emergency procedure training, the simulator operator places the aircrew in 
increasingly dire circumstances, rapidly degrading the aircraft and weather until there is 
only one option left – ejection.  The crew are trained to save the aircraft when possible, 
but when survival is contingent upon leaving the aircraft behind, the aircrew must 
recognize this and act without hesitation, as any delay may result in the loss of both the 
plane and the pilot.  Early in training, the author found that his attempts to save the 
aircraft, due to pride and vanity, resulted in a late acceptance of the need to eject and a 
simulated loss of both the aircraft and himself.  
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3.2.3  Decision Making 
 Decision making is quite simply that – the act of choosing a course of action and 
then following through.  Even if one opts not to decide, a choice has been made – one not 
to act.  A failure to act is not a lack of decision, it is a decision not to act.  So, when 
confronted with even a minor dilemma, humans are required to elect a path of action.  As 
previously stated, the decision will be based upon the individual’s situational awareness, 
derived from the many sources available.  The results of these actions typically provide 
feedback, and this feedback will result in a new appraisal of the situation, providing a 
new level of SA.  So, the decision-making cycle repeats, continuously.  This cycle is 
natural and unavoidable, as life is a dynamic enterprise.   
 In aviation decisiveness is usually seen as being beneficial.  Excessive flexibility, 
“waffling” between decisions, belies a lack of confidence in one’s assessment of the 
situation – a lack of SA.  But decisions, when made, must be communicated.  This allows 
the other personnel involved to update their awareness, and continue their own cycle with 
the knowledge of each person’s elected course of action.  The goal, discussed shortly, is 
that all crewmembers reach the same conclusion regarding the decision at hand! 
3.2.4 The Decision-Making Cycle 
With the three elements of the decision-making cycle defined, the process itself 
becomes a logical flow: an event causes a change in a person’s SA, which may or may 
not be internalized based on the adaptability of that person.  With the altered SA, the 
person is forced to make a decision, which may include the decision to do nothing.  
Again, this process occurs for every decision one makes, throughout life, and does not 
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require any human interaction – the cycle occurs internally, mentally.  An experience that 
befell the author illustrates this process and how it occurs internally: 
While cruising at altitude in an experimental airplane, returning home, the author 
noted an unusual vibration.  The propeller-driven aircraft had not previously exhibited 
this vibration mode, and this caused concern.  Thus, the Situational Awareness of the 
author was now changed, in that the odd vibration elicited a serious concern for safety.  
However, the author was eager to return home, and a lack of flexibility caused him to 
seek only to define the vibration, so the decision to continue the flight was made.  In the 
effort to define the vibration, the engine power and RPM were varied from minimum to 
maximum settings, with the author working now at the knowledge-based level.  Shortly 
thereafter, and with the power at maximum, approximately 2/3 of one propeller blade 
fractured and departed the aircraft (see figure 2).  This resulted in tremendous vibration, 
due to the out-of-balance condition of the propeller and the high RPM setting.  Now, the 
author’s SA was that the vibration had been the signal of the impending failure, and was 
able to rapidly adapt to the new situation, shifting between the skill-based task of 
maintaining control and the knowledge-based assessment of damage and possible courses 
of action.  Fortunately, fear did not impede his actions, and although anxiety was rather 
high, the decision was then made to stop the rotation of the engine as quickly as possible.  
With this task accomplished, his SA immediately dictated that a forced landing would be 
required, and the decision was made to search for the nearest suitable airfield… this 
process continued until a dead-stick landing was safely completed on a nearby paved 
runway.  No other human was involved in this process (the battery had been torn from its  
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Figure 2 
Author’s Aircraft Following Propeller Failure 
(Author) 
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mounts and no radio calls were possible), illustrating the often dynamic, yet individual 
nature of the decision-making cycle.   
This decision-making cycle occurs for all three categories of human performance: 
at the skill, rule and knowledge-based levels.  During skill-based performance, the cycle 
is primarily subconscious, with sentient cognition being devoted to the monitoring of the 
subconscious performance.  Behavior modification at this level must be accomplished 
through repetitive training, and again, is not the focus of this discussion.  For the rule and 
knowledge-based efforts, however, information is consciously sought in the desire to 
develop one’s Situational Awareness.  Information comes from the three basic sources 
previously mentioned: internal sources, physical systems, and other humans.  How each 
person interprets the data provided, though, may vary wildly. 
3.3  How Humans Affect Sources of Information 
No two humans perceive an event the same.  Each will color the physical 
evidence presented with internal prejudices and expectations, regardless of attempts not 
to.  Easy examples of this phenomenon are eyewitness accounts of anything unusual.  
People will have different, sometimes radically disparate recollections of exactly the 
same event.  When examining interviews of witnesses to a recent aviation accident, the 
author noted surprising differences in the stories.  An aircraft crashed over the top of a 
road, and several drivers saw the aircraft pass directly in front of their vehicles.  
Considering the proximity of the aircraft, it should have been relatively easy to determine 
the attitude of the plane, but half of the eyewitnesses saw the aircraft inverted and half 
saw it upright.  Upon reviewing the backgrounds of the persons, it was noted that those 
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who saw it upright had relatively little experience with aviation, while those who saw it 
inverted were either pilots or had spent considerable time working with aircraft.  This 
discrepancy might be explained by the expectations and experience of each person: those 
with aviation experience knew that an aircraft was perfectly capable of flying inverted, 
while those unfamiliar likely never expected to see an aircraft upside-down and probably 
didn’t think that such flight was possible.  This simple observation implies far-reaching 
consequences: the people involved in any aviation activity, from the pilots to the ground 
controllers, rarely if ever completely agree on the events of any given moment.   
 Because of the inconsistency of human interpretation, any attempt to improve 
crew decision-making must recognize and address this phenomenon.  The persons 
involved must “agree to disagree” and then work actively to resolve their differences of 
opinion.  Although this disparity can be a severe hindrance to aircraft operations, it can 
also be a blessing and is the primary justification for having a multi-crewed cockpit.  The 
ability of a second person to recognize judgmental or interpretive errors committed by 
another crewmember provides benefit and safety to operations.  Certainly, humans are 
not perfect, and a second impression of the situation often serves to highlight a deficiency 
on the part of the person exercising control over the aircraft.   
With this understanding, aircrew must seek to ascertain the factors that affect their 
fellow crew’s interpretation of the world.  Again, no two human beings are alike, and no 
two people will completely agree on circumstances.  Three concepts are the most 
significant factors in the variance of human opinion.  They are: past experience, overload 
conditions, and prejudices and biases.  Each of these will be discussed in detail.  Team 
Decision Making relies on the ability of each of the members to consider these concepts  
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Figure 3 
Human Corruption of Information  
(Author)) 
 
 
when relating to each other.  Figure 3 illustrates these three elements and how each 
affects information arriving at an individual: these elements form one’s “bubble.” 
3.3.1  Past Experience  
Past experience is the tendency for humans to model their world.  Based on 
previous life experiences, humans tend to expect events to occur as they have observed in 
the past.  This is unavoidable and is difficult to consciously recognize, but it occurs for 
every experience in life.  Humans appreciate predictability, and seek to model their world 
so that they may anticipate the consequences of certain actions.  The power of experience 
to shape and influence behavior is tremendous – consider the following anecdote: 
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 Begin with a cage full of monkeys, place a ladder in the center and above the 
ladder, hang a stalk of bananas.  As soon as the first monkey starts to climb the ladder 
seeking the bananas, spray all of the monkeys in the cage with cold water.  Each time a 
monkey attempts to climb the ladder, again spray the entire group with freezing water.  
After a time, the group will begin to discourage or prevent any of its members from 
climbing the ladder, in an effort to avoid the punishment of the cold water.  Once this 
behavior is consistent, replace one of the monkeys with an outsider, unfamiliar with the 
circumstances.  Of course, the new monkey will begin to climb the ladder, seeking the 
bananas.  Now, however, even before being sprayed with water the members of the 
original group will attack the new monkey to avoid the dousing.  Continue replacing 
individual monkeys, until the entire original group is gone, but the behavior will persist. 
Although this scenario is fictitious, it is easy to see similarities in human behavior.  This 
reflects the power of experience – once an event is expected to occur, people with prior 
experience will behave as though the outcome they expect is inevitable, regardless of its 
likelihood.  There are, of course, varying degrees of commitment to expectations, but the 
severity of the consequences generally influences this commitment.  If a general aviation 
pilot, when practicing stalls, enters an incipient spin upon adding full power to recover, 
then he or she will likely be hesitant to add full power during the next attempt at the 
maneuver.  This reaction can be “trained out” through repeated demonstration of the 
maneuver and correct techniques, but what if that pilot was only given one chance to 
practice that maneuver before being asked to perform it at fifty feet? 
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 Now, what if there was a co-pilot in this aircraft performing stalls at fifty feet?  
And what if, during this co-pilot’s training, his or her one attempt at a stall recovery using 
full power resulted in a smooth and controlled recovery with minimal loss of altitude?  It 
is reasonable to expect that the two aircrew would respond to the situation differently, 
based on their past experience and expected outcomes regarding traditional recovery 
techniques.  While one pilot would be hesitant to add full power because of fear of a spin 
at fifty feet, the other would likely slam the throttle forward to avoid a hard landing, 
precipitating a conflict on the flight deck.  This potential for disagreement is always 
present, as all humans and their attendant experiences are different.  This must be 
acknowledged and addressed in risk management, especially in aviation.  Aircrew must 
accept that the experience of their compatriots will not mirror their own, and so a primary 
goal of Team Decision Making is the reconciliation of each aircrew’s expectations for a 
given situation.   
An actual example of expectation occurred in March of 2002, when a cargo 
carrier’s DC-8 landed at McGhee Tyson field in Tennessee and was instructed to taxi to 
but hold short of an active runway.  The crew heard tower instruct landing traffic on the 
active runway to make a 180-degree turn and back-taxi on the runway.  Upon observing 
the traffic land and begin its back-taxi, the crew of the DC-8 reached the hold-short and 
assumed tower had provided clearance to cross, as the traffic was obviously also at taxi 
speed and there could be no additional landing traffic with one already back-taxiing on 
the runway.  Tower had, in fact, not issued the clearance to cross, and although no harm 
was done, the crew was reminded of the pitfalls of expectations (NASA, 2003).  Another 
case where past experience caused a near-emergency was the flight of a Jetstream 4100 
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bound for Washington Dulles.  When refueling, the crew was not given a receipt 
specifying fuel added to the aircraft.  Because they had not received a receipt on an 
earlier trip that day to the same airport, and the aircraft had been refueled, they “were not 
too concerned”.  Due to time pressure to maintain schedule, the pre-takeoff checks were 
rushed, and it was not until reaching cruising altitude that the aircrew realized there was 
insufficient fuel onboard to reach Dulles – obviously the aircraft had not been serviced.  
In this instance, a safe divert was made, but the lack of receipt was an indicator which 
went unnoticed because of prior experience (NASA, 2003).  Quoting Navy Lieutenant 
Lawrence Reay “Expectations can lead to disappointment, and in the air, they can be 
deadly.” (NSC, 2001).   
3.3.2  Overload  
Overload can best be summarized as “too much information”.  There is a limit to 
the amount of information any given human can effectively process at a given time.  
Subconsciously, a person may be aware of most of the stimuli present, but cognitively, 
only so much will be internalized into the decision-making process.  Under conditions of 
high stress, another negative aspect of overload is that only stimuli matching the expected 
outcome or supporting the current decision will be recognized.  Information that conflicts 
with a person’s desired outcome or past experience (see above) will be ignored or 
discounted as inaccurate.   
In the presence of particular failures, especially those which create conflicting 
opinions on the flight deck, overload can lead to a focused, unyielding approach to a 
problem.  In instances where the failure is correctly diagnosed, this can be a beneficial 
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result.  However, if the failure is difficult to discern or misdiagnosed, tragedy can be 
expected.  An example of this is a COPA airlines 737-200, which, on June 6th, 1992 
crashed near La Palma, Panama with the loss of all 47 onboard (ASN, 2004).  The 
aircraft broke apart in-flight after exceeding its maximum allowable speed.  The reason it 
plunged toward the earth at an attitude and speed known to be unsafe apparently lay in 
the cockpit instruments.  At some point in the flight, the captain’s attitude indicator 
insidiously failed.  Thinking that the aircraft was diverging from the autopilot 
commanded attitude, the autopilot was disconnected and the aircraft hand-flown.  
Although the standby attitude indicator was apparently correct, the attention of the 
captain and first officer focused on the primary system in the effort to restore the aircraft 
to level flight.  Unfortunately, the flight was at night, so there was no visible horizon 
available to easily diagnose the incorrect instrument.  Following the failed primary 
instrument until the end, believing it to be correct, and unable to search for alternative 
solutions under the stress of a rapidly accelerating aircraft, the crew flew an otherwise 
healthy aircraft into a terminal dive. 
 A very similar occurrence caused the loss of at least five Piper Malibu aircraft in a 
two-year span from 1989 until 1991.  Fairly inexperienced pilots flew these complex 
aircraft into instrument and icing conditions.  In all cases, it was suspected that the pitot 
heat was not turned on in these circumstances.  Predictably, the airspeed indicators soon 
failed, and as the pilots attempted to maintain control of their aircraft, they fixated on the 
airspeed indicator.  Because the flights were in IFR conditions, there was no familiar 
truth data available in the form of a visible horizon, and so the SA of each of the pilots 
was that their airspeed was decaying and that a stall was imminent.  Unfortunately, this 
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focus, in a very intensely trying flight regime, caused each of the pilots to accelerate in an 
attempt to regain indications of flying airspeed with a resultant severe overspeed, 
structural failure and in-flight breakup of the Piper.  Cognitive overload was certainly a 
factor, as the other instruments could have provided vital information, but were 
overlooked.  This phenomenon, in addition to spatial disorientation, is described in the 
NTSB’s report on these mishaps: 
 
 Although the pilot’s fixation on indicated airspeed was probably the 
initiating event in his loss of control of the airplane, spatial disorientation could 
easily have occurred because of the fixation.  Fixation results in the omission of a 
cross check of other performance and control instruments.  If the omission lasts 
for more than a few seconds in a dynamic situation, the pilot may tend to 
disbelieve the other instruments in preference to a single instrument when the 
cross check is resumed, particularly if the dynamics of the situation have confused 
the pilot’s internal motion sensing and position sensing systems.  When this 
occurs, the pilot is spatially disoriented, and he or she may tend to fixate more 
strongly on the single instrument.  (NTSB, 1992) 
 
3.3.3  Prejudices and Biases 
Prejudices and biases are very similar to past experience, with the notable 
exception that personal experience is not a contributor.  Prejudice arises as a result of 
cultural norms learned by an individual of the course of a lifetime.  These cultural norms 
will develop when exposed to any related environment, and although flight related 
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prejudices might not develop until interacting with that community, prejudices relating to 
human interaction will be present from soon after birth.  Consider the anecdote of the 
monkeys above – the replacement monkeys in the experiment would be behaving based 
on prejudice, since there would be no actual experience of being sprayed with water.  For 
example, while growing up in Texas, the author found that every soda was referred to as 
a “Coke”.  A typical exchange in a fast food restaurant would be: “I’d like a Coke.”  
“OK, which kind?”  “A Pepsi, please.”  This was the prejudice carried into the first fast-
food restaurant visited in California, where, having no experience with the restaurant or 
the state, a “Coke” was ordered.  Surprised at not being asked which version, the author 
was disappointed when an actual “Coke” was delivered when actually a “Sprite” had 
been desired!   
Again, humans appreciate an ordered and predictable environment.  A prejudice, 
unlike past experience, is a person’s application of empirical knowledge to related 
circumstances.  Despite having had no direct familiarity with a given event, humans will 
logically extrapolate recognizable characteristics into expectations of an outcome that 
falls within their mental model of the world.  Certainly, this can be a dangerous 
predisposition, especially since the world does not always behave according to each 
person’s predictive model.   
Prejudice will also arise from communal exchanges, where one individual’s 
experience can become the collective prejudice of a group.  This can be both good and 
bad, depending on the information and outcome related by the person with the 
experience.  In many cases, “chair flying”, or storytelling by senior pilots is considered a 
beneficial event.  In this way, a large group can learn from the experiences of a select 
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few.  By using this resource of collective experience and knowledge, aircrew may gain 
insight to situations and crises without directly suffering the consequences.  Conversely, 
this empirical knowledge may be based on an unusual, single event or even derived from 
a misinterpretation of events by the experienced pilot.  As previously discussed, 
perception of an environment is heavily dependent on the individual, and no two humans 
will agree on all of the features.  In this way, second-hand knowledge gained through the 
filters of a primary instructor can be contaminated with the perceptive and judgment 
errors of that instructor.  Because of this, standardized training examples that have been 
reviewed by a large pool of experienced aircrew are appropriate.  By allowing a group 
norm to be applied to the event and decisions, assurance is gained that the lessons taught 
are appropriate for at least a majority of the community. 
Biases are related to prejudice, but are defined as an internally developed 
preference to expect a given outcome.  Simply, a bias is an extrapolation of a person’s 
individual experience and the desired results of the current situation.  A bias involves 
emotional attachment to a desired outcome.  A bias may or may not include the influence 
of past experience or prejudice.   
Biases include the expectation of a given outcome based on desire – a want or 
need for a particular solution.  Because biases involve emotion, they are often somewhat 
irrational.  In this respect, it is important that a crewmember be familiar with not only 
themselves, but with the other members of the crew, even on a personal level.  There may 
be factors, not immediately apparent to others, which drive an individual to interpret 
events in a manner that supports their desired outcome.  For example, a co-pilot might 
understand that a “chance of severe thunderstorms” indicates an area best avoided, while 
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a pilot who desperately wants to reach that area might perceive the same information as 
“only a chance, so there should be no problems at all!”   
The effects of bias might have been a factor in the runway overrun of an 
American Airlines MD-80, Flight 1420, on the 1st of June 1999, in Little Rock, Arkansas.  
In this mishap the aircrew were on the third leg of a long flying day, having also 
encountered delays.  The weather forecast at Little Rock included a probability of 
thunderstorms, and there were in fact thunderstorms near the field when the aircraft 
entered the terminal area.  Because of the storms, the winds at the airport were strong and 
gusting with significant variation in direction.  The first officer and co-pilot engaged in a 
discussion of the crosswind limitations of the MD-80, anticipating problems due to the 
conditions.  The first officer initially suggested that 30 knots was the crosswind limit, but 
the captain reminded him that a wet runway was likely and that 20 knots was the wet 
runway crosswind limit.  The first officer revised his opinion to 25 knots, but neither 
aircrew took any further action to verify the limit (which was actually 20 knots).  The 
crew then made several radio exchanges with the local controllers, discussing the severe 
weather present at Little Rock.  After requesting and receiving a runway change to reduce 
the crosswind, the tower updated the winds.  As reported, they were out of limits, but the 
first officer read the transmission back such that the crosswinds were within limits:   
 
At 2347:08, the controller again cleared flight 1420 to land and indicated that the 
wind was 350º at 30 knots gusting to 45 knots. The first officer then read back the 
wind information as 030º at 45 knots (NTSB, 2001).   
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There were many other meteorological effects during the aircrafts approach, 
including heavy rain, hail, reduced visibility and wind gusts ultimately recorded as high 
as 76 knots.  Why the aircrew would even attempt the approach is questionable, but quite 
disconcerting is the fact that the first officer mentally altered the tower winds so that the 
crosswind would fall within limits.  This could be attributed to a misunderstanding of the 
tower’s transmission, but “030” is a significant transposition of “350”.  Considering this 
and the other contra-indicators that were discounted when attempting the approach, it is 
likely that both the captain and the first officer were subconsciously biased to hear only 
information supporting their attempt to land safely.  Unfortunately, they did not, and the 
captain and nine others lost their lives as a result.  The aftermath is shown in detail in 
figure 4. 
3.3.4  Emotions 
Emotions can also play a significant role in a person’s approach to a given 
scenario.  Although emotions are very difficult to quantify, they certainly affect how an 
individual gathers information, relates to others, and makes decisions.  Varying states of 
distress or eustress (stress of a positive nature) can radically alter a person’s behavior.  
Perhaps it would be beneficial if life was consistent and predictable, but it is certainly not 
and this unpredictability can lead to stress. 
Stress is not always a detriment, as eustress can improve aircrew performance in 
times of crisis.  When faced with an exceptionally challenging situation, many people 
“rise to the occasion” and better their normal performance.  This is eustress – where 
demands or danger heighten a person’s ability to process and interpret information and   
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Figure 4 
Ameri errun 
(Unknown, http://www.airdisaster.com/photos/) 
can Airlines Flight 1420 Following Runway Ov
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quicken the decision making process.  Eustress occurs at different level for different 
people.  A level of tasking that drives one person to excel may cause another to break 
down completely and cease functioning under the pressure.  Thus, it is incumbent on each 
team member to be aware of how stress affects themselves as well as their teammates.  At 
times, leaders may seek to employ this phenomenon by driving peers or subordinates to 
increase output.  But this requires skill and the knowledge of the others in order to avoid 
breaking down the team by overtasking.  Too, eustress is a time-limited occurrence, and 
one cannot be expected to function under severe conditions indefinitely as all people have 
a breaking point. 
Fear can be another significant emotion, as fear can debilitate members of the 
team rapidly.  Aircrew often consider themselves immune to fear, but it is not only the 
people airborne that must be considered.  Air Traffic Controllers, Tower Controllers, and 
others play critical roles in aviation operations.  The loss of effective contribution from 
these members during times of crisis can be disastrous if their contributions are required 
for the safe navigation and performance of the aircraft.  When placed in imminent peril, 
some individuals will cease to function, and will be unable to perform even menial 
regular duties - this must be considered.  Too, some individuals may react with panic or 
aggressiveness, which can become even more dangerous.  Although the flight crew are 
probably not the immediate threat, what of the passenger who suddenly attacks others or 
begins screaming hysterically when discovering the aircraft is in danger?   
Aviation can often be very time sensitive, considering the limited fuel and rapid 
speeds of modern aircraft.  This adds considerably to the stress of all involved, and tends 
to expose emotions much more readily than more sedate vocations.  Although the subject 
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of controlling emotions is well beyond the scope of this paper, the substantial impact of 
emotions must be considered when relating to other members of the aviation team.   
3.3.5  “Sixth Sense”   
Although the existence of a “sixth sense” may not be universally accepted, there 
are certainly cases where humans have cited premonitions or “uneasy feelings” as 
guiding influences in decision making.  Even in aviation, aircrew and other personnel 
respond to these influences.  It is thus appropriate to address the existence of internal, 
subconscious factors best described as a “sixth sense”.  This attribute can often alter 
behavior patterns, such as the pilot who senses “something not quite right” and checks 
the engine instruments without prompting and independent of habit patterns, only to 
discover subtle and otherwise undetectable signs of impending failure.  The author had 
just such an experience, re-checking the engine instruments of an F/A-18 Hornet after 
takeoff from Misawa, Japan.  Although the indications were within limits and had been 
repeatedly checked during the takeoff roll, a subsequent scan revealed one engine to have 
slightly lower oil pressure than the other.  While within limits, the value seemed odd, and 
the author returned to base, to find an aft bearing seal blown and half of the lubricating 
oil gone from the engine.  Had the flight continued, the engine would have been lost over 
the middle of a cold and desolate sea. 
 Whether or not an individual accepts the idea of a “sixth sense”, one should 
respect the power of premonition when dealing with others.  These feelings can be 
overpowering in some cases, and can seriously affect a person’s ability to function.  
Although one crewmember may discount the possibility, another may be virtually 
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disabled by the effects of such a phenomenon.  Because of this, all persons should accept 
the fact that others may be affected by premonitions or otherwise inexplicable feelings.  
Typically, a reasoning approach is the best method to combat this occurrence, and 
sympathy is advisable.  An adversarial, dismissive attack on a person’s emotions will 
likely meet with resistance and do little to resolve the situation.     
3.4  Summary of Individual Decision Making 
The elements of Situational Awareness, Adaptability/Flexibility, and Decision 
Making flow together to form a decision-making cycle, as illustrated in figure 5.   
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The Individual Decision-Making Cycle 
(Author) 
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This cycle occurs for every decision we, as human beings, make throughout life.  There 
need not be any other persons involved – the cycle can occur internally or with the 
interaction of many other people.  A person assesses their environment, thus forming 
one’s situational awareness.  The flexibility of that individual determines if that 
assessment is internalized or ignored due to competing priorities, and then a decision is 
made.  Once a decision is acted upon, the environment changes and a revised opinion is 
formed – one’s situational awareness changes, beginning the cycle anew.   Significantly, 
however, the cycle is not necessarily identical for people in “identical” situations. 
Each member of a crew must acknowledge that others may not interpret a 
situation exactly the same, due to that person’s past experience, overload, and prejudices 
(the “POP” phenomenon) and each must seek familiarity with how “POP” affects the 
others in a crew.  Because the situational awareness of crewmembers will always exhibit 
minor (and sometimes major) differences, aircrew must understand that each will often 
reach different conclusions regarding the appropriate course of action.  It is because of 
familiarity that longstanding crews become comfortable with one another – each has 
knowledge of how “POP” will color the other’s reaction to certain situations.  Still, there 
is always the possibility of truly unusual events, and complacency must be avoided.  
Knowledge truly is power, and the recognition of the aforementioned phenomenon is 
important for everyone involved in aviation decision-making.   
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4.  AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
 
 The systems of modern aircraft have become increasingly capable and tend to 
supply far greater information and detail to the aircrew.  Unfortunately, this trend has led 
to an overabundance of detail, or the masking of critical indicators that the aircraft is 
expected to monitor for the aircrew.  Automation and computer aids can potentially 
relieve cockpit workload, but they can also greatly compound it.  This section will deal 
with the methods of presenting vital information to the crew, examine some of the 
pitfalls, and proffer suggestions for improving the physical systems of the cockpit. 
4.1  Instrumentation 
The traditional source of information in the cockpit comes from the 
instrumentation.  The daunting array of gauges and dials spread across the panel of 
almost any plane seems overwhelming to most people.  The aircrew’s need for an 
exceptionally detailed status of the critical systems onboard an aircraft drives this 
arrangement.  The situational awareness of the aircrew is derived from the data presented, 
and decisions affecting, and sometimes risking, the lives of hundreds of people are made 
based on the interpretation of that data.  But, instrumentation does not always present 
information.  Too often, the multiple gauges and dials report only relatively meaningless 
numbers, when the goal is to present information – where “…information [is] the 
reduction of uncertainty”(Sanders & McCormick, 1993).  A modern cockpit must be 
assembled so that the advanced displays improve the crew’s situational awareness by 
eliminating uncertainty regarding the aircraft’s operational state.  This places a 
tremendous responsibility on the designer of the modern cockpit: to ensure that the means 
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of conveying information are both accurate and easily interpreted.  This does not always 
occur, and the aircrew are left to compensate for deficiencies in the design of the human-
machine interface in many aircraft. 
 How, then, to best ensure that data is conveyed efficiently and without error?  
There are decisions regarding the medium, the format, and the content of each element of 
displayed information or active message.  Is it best to rely on directed-attention discrete 
messaging, or passive, continuous presentation of critical parameters?  This is but one of 
many questions the cockpit designer and end-state user must ask, and the answer depends 
on what is being conveyed.  In order to simplify the morass of possible questions, it is 
best to break the designer’s task into three basic areas:  what is the best method of 
classifying the data to be presented, then; what is the best means of presenting that data, 
and finally; what decisions can be automated to relieve the aircrew of the need to 
interpret data?  These functional questions will be addressed in succession, with the intent 
of explaining the efforts of a human factors engineer and providing some structure for 
modern crews to evaluate and employ a modern, efficient, and safe cockpit. 
One of the most critical human factors in the design of a cockpit is the 
presentation of information and the execution of decisions associated with that 
information.  The physical accommodation and support of an aircrew is vital, but the time 
critical and precise nature of aircraft positioning, attitude and condition demands special 
consideration.  The complexity of a typical cockpit is daunting.  All of the gauges, dials, 
and switches form an overwhelming interface, one that typically requires a great deal of 
practice in order to achieve efficiency in the interpretation of data.  Because mistakes in 
aviation can hold dire consequences, this task is unusually important.  The task of the 
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cockpit designer is thus simplifying and streamlining this interface as much as possible 
while aiding the aircrew in making, and executing, decisions.  Until very recently, there 
were many technological factors that limited the interface options available in aviation.  
With the advent of the microcomputer, however, there is now a myriad of possibilities 
regarding the gathering of data, display of information, and ultimately the control of an 
aircraft.  This section will take an abbreviated look at each of these functional areas and 
make generic recommendations regarding each.  Although not a comprehensive treatise, 
the intent is to explore the rapidly expanding technology regarding the man-machine 
interface present in the modern cockpit and the configurations a modern crew must 
become proficient with. 
4.2  Classification of Data and Organization 
The most obvious need within the cockpit is the means of communicating 
information to the aircrew.  This requires addressing the medium of communication, but 
even before this decision is made, it is important to determine how data will be classified 
and organized.  Data is usually what is being presented to the aircrew, but the goal is for 
it to immediately become information.  Information is an abstract concept, but is best 
represented through the following description: 
 
Data are numerical representations… If the data can be associated with a specific 
sensor or source, the meaning of that data becomes clear, and this transforms the 
numerical data into information that can be viewed and interpreted by human 
beings or automated systems. (Marsh, et al., 2001) 
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As a rule, data should be: classifiable, identifiable, and readily interpreted.  This 
leads to rapid assimilation as information.  Classification of data could best be described 
as tying it to a general system on the aircraft.  Identification would then be obviating the 
specific item within that system.  Making data readily interpreted is a distinct challenge, 
and requires consideration of both human factors and psychological impacts.  
Classification can be accomplished through grouping, commonality of shape or actuation, 
method of presentation, or many other methods.  Grouping would be keeping certain 
items in one location in the cockpit, like all of the engine instruments in one area of the 
panel.  Using identical shapes and sizes for those engine instruments, or perhaps only 
levers to control landing systems, would address commonality of shape or function.  The 
presentation methods might include visual displays, auditory cues, tactile shapes, and 
others.  For example, in Navy aircraft, emergency system controls are all painted yellow 
and black – thus classifying them.  In a P-3 Orion, the gear handle has a round shape 
while the flap handle is shaped like an airfoil, identifying each of these landing system 
controls.  The interpretation of data, however, involves a more complex cognitive 
process. 
 To make data readily interpreted, additional considerations must be addressed.  
The most important is: what is the required level of precision for interpretation?  The 
more precision necessary, typically the more space required.  An obvious example is the 
dashboard of a car – the speedometer is dominant, indicating its importance and the 
precision with which the operator must judge speed.  Next smaller in size would often be 
the temperature gauge, which is important performance information but does not need to 
be interpreted to the degree.  Smallest might be the “oil low” light, which does not 
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indicate performance or require significant interpretation, but is critical nonetheless.  The 
concept of “performance information” is simply how that information relates to decision 
making within the cockpit.  If the information will lead to adjustments to reach desired 
states of operation, then it should be considered performance information.  If the 
information indicates failure states, it may be vitally important but it is not performance 
information.  There is limited space in a cockpit, and so determination of the criticality of 
each piece of information is required.  A cockpit must present information, and do so 
with the necessary resolution.  There are three basic mediums by which this can be 
accomplished: auditory, visual or tactile means, and each deserves consideration. 
4.3  Presentation and the Interpretation of Information (Data) 
 With the technology of today, there are countless options regarding the 
presentation of data, far more than even ten years ago.  Instead of round dials, the 
instrument panel can consist of color displays, LED bar graphs, animated checklists, and 
more.  But just because something is new does not mean it will positively contribute to 
safety and awareness in the cockpit.  “Technology for technology’s sake” is a very real 
danger in modern design.  Replicating traditional instruments on a video screen does not 
make a “glass cockpit”.  Rather, modern cockpit design should contribute to reduced 
workloads and improved awareness through innovative methods – not innovation applied 
to traditional methods. 
 
With regard to the flight deck work, …there is mounting evidence that modern 
flight deck avionics systems can reduce pilot situational awareness instead of 
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improving it.  A recent report by British Airways concluded that "glass cockpits 
have not been as successful as had been hoped in improving situational 
awareness," and that "degradation of situational awareness ... is a serious 
problem." Future developments in civil operations that could increase pilot 
workload and might even overload the flight crew with information are also a 
concern, ... (Birch, 2000) 
   
When presenting information, there are three basic mediums available to the 
designer: visual, tactile and auditory.  The most prominent is the visual medium, since 
we, as humans, use our eyes as our predominant sensor.  Auditory and tactile cues are 
much less employed, but still very valid means of communicating both data and 
information.  In practice, auditory cues appear to be more reliable than tactile, depending 
on the data presented.  This is due to a lack of resolution in tactile input.  A human’s 
ability to accurately and consistently spatially locate items (without visual input or a great 
deal of practice) is limited, and tactile identification of similar items is difficult.  
However, certain discrete items of information can easily be transmitted via tactile 
methods, such as a stick shaker, which is typically used to indicate the onset of a stall.  
There is research being conducted by the Navy into the use of a tactile vest that transmits 
aircraft attitude information to a helicopter pilot.  The intent is to allow a helicopter pilot 
to hover in instrument conditions, while looking outside of the aircraft.  The vest uses 
small vibrators placed about the torso to indicate drift and attitude changes via pulsations 
in discrete locations.  This is certainly an esoteric example of tactile information, but it 
effectively illustrates the variety of methods available to convey information. 
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4.3.1  Visual Information 
 Often the simplest and most reliable method is visual presentation.  The visual 
sense is the primary source of information for the human being, and is heavily relied 
upon.  As a result, it is also the most developed, and is highly accurate and sensitive.  
This allows the cockpit designer a great deal of flexibility but coincidentally places much 
responsibility upon him or her.  Any flaws or shortcomings in the visual equipment will 
be readily noticed and, if critical information is lost, result in mistakes.  Visual systems 
are also the most highly developed, and can include such advanced items as “Heads-Up 
Displays (HUDs)”.  This innovative display places information in the pilot’s field-of-
view, focused at infinity, and thus alleviates the need to scan traditional instruments.  The 
human eye requires approximately ¾ of a second to re-focus (Mansueti, 2002), and this 
timesaving can result in benefit in truly time critical situations.  Other displays that can be 
located in or near the aircrew’s field-of-view include basic indicators that rely upon 
simple shapes or colors, and can thus be interpreted using peripheral vision.  For these to 
be successful they must dominate that portion of the scene – the shape or color must 
stand out from the background in order to be recognized and interpreted via peripheral 
vision.  On the instrument panel itself, the advent of Cathode Ray Tubes (CRTs) and 
Liquid Crystal Displays (LCDs) have allowed the display engineer the ability to create a 
re-configurable panel – one that can adapt to the flight phase and the information 
requirements attendant with it.  This is an area requiring much research – what is the best 
format for presenting each bit of information so that the flight crew readily interprets it.  
All of the human factors involved are beyond the scope of this paper, but some basic 
principles are worth noting. 
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 An unfortunate trend in modern design is toward the presentation of strictly data.  
In many cases, new cockpit displays supply only raw numbers to the aircrew.  Despite the 
obvious utility of a large, easily read number placed prominently on a screen, there is 
actually less “information” supplied than on a dial gauge with markings.  A number is 
just that – a number – and it has no meaning (and thus is not information) until it is 
correlated to some respective database contained in the aircrew’s memory.  A dial gauge, 
though, shows not only the current, say, airspeed, but also the significance and magnitude 
of that airspeed in relation to the marked never exceed and stalling speeds of the airplane.  
Rate information is also present, seen in the speed of movement of an analog pointer.    
This provides information to the pilot without the cognitive correlation that numerical 
data demands.  Tape gauges that show no endpoints or relative scale lack information – 
they are data only.  The goal of the modern cockpit must be to present readily assimilated 
information – information that is intuitive.  This is accomplished through displays that 
employ motion relative to the data being presented, that show data in linear relation to the 
appropriate limits, and use consistent symbology and graphics within the same 
classification of data.  Graphical depictions also make interpretation much easier, such as 
a moving map to show aircraft positioning and ground track, or an end view of the 
airplane with each weapon station and loading depicted on a display.  When using 
graphical presentations, attempts should be made to use consistent presentations and to 
adopt any industry standards that might exist (whether formal or by general acceptance). 
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4.3.2 Auditory Information 
 Auditory information has great potential to relieve some of the visual burden of 
overtasked aircrew.  Unfortunately, the auditory sense is generally unused except for 
communication with external agencies.  Modern fighter aircraft, though, rely greatly on 
sounds for the purpose of conveying critical information to the pilot.  A notable 
disadvantage of this format, however, is that “auditory rather than visual presentation 
often leads to more rapid but more error-prone processing, a fact that in part leads aircraft 
designers to use auditory displays only for the most critical alerts, where speed response 
is vital.”  (Wickens, 1992).  The response time for auditory stimulation is 120-185 msec, 
while visual stimulation requires 150-225 msec to be processed (Casler, 2000).  The F/A-
18 Hornet, for example, uses tones to inform the pilot of enemy radars tracking his 
aircraft, of any exceedance of aerodynamic limitations, and of the status of weapons 
about to be fired.  The Hornet also uses pre-recorded voices to announce failure states of 
the aircraft (NAVAIR, 2000).  Current research includes the use of three-dimensional 
audio systems to provide spatial information to the listener.  Although the stall warning 
horn is a long-lasting example of auditory information, the potential will soon exist to 
supplement an aircrew’s spatial, temporal and general situational awareness using 
auditory input.  The challenge will be applying technology smartly – as conflicts with 
communication messages may arise and create priority issues.  Deconfliction of audio 
messaging can be accomplished using variances in the format of the communication 
(tones vs. the spoken word) or by relative volumes, including eclipsing.    
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4.3.3  Tactile Information 
 Tactile information is the least common form of presentation.  The primary reason 
is the limited interface available – the pilot’s hands are the highest resolution interface 
present (Mansueti, 2002) and are generally in contact with the aircraft – but are usually 
actively involved in the control of the aircraft.  The other areas in constant contact – the 
feet, back and buttocks – possess much lower concentration of nerve endings and are of 
much lower resolution.  As such, only limited precision can be tactilely communicated.  
Switch and control levers typically use some form of tactile coding, however, to permit 
ready identification without visual confirmation.  General aviation has adopted a standard 
for engine controls that includes a smooth knob for the throttle, a grooved knob for the 
propeller control, and a sharp-ribbed knob for the mixture control.  This permits tactile-
only identification.  But very few examples of tactile information systems currently exist: 
one would be the stick shaker employed on several business jets and airliners to indicate 
a near stalling angle-of-attack.  Future uses of this medium could include a vibrating 
brake pedal to indicate functioning ABS, a vibration in the seat to warn of an impending 
exceedance of the acceleration limit of the airplane, or even the attitude vest mentioned 
above.  Fortunately, tactile information must be very simple, and thus should be easily 
interpreted.  Too much complexity, though, can make this medium almost impossible to 
resolve.  A bank of multiple switches can prove difficult to sort through without direct 
cognitive attention, just as too many vibrations or pressures would readily overwhelm an 
aircrew not solely focused on interpreting that information. 
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4.4  Automation of Decisions 
 The rapid development of the computer has made true revolutions possible in the 
control of mechanical systems.  Previously, all monitoring and decision making in 
mechanical systems was relegated to either a human or a simple hydro-mechanical device 
with limited inputs.  But with the tremendous processing power of the computer, 
decisions can now be made automatically and with due consideration to an ever-
increasing number of variables.  The modern cockpit designer must carefully apply this 
technological revolution, though, in order to avoid serious safety concerns.  A computer 
is only as good as the folks who program it, and is still very fallible as a consequence.  
This means that humans must retain oversight of the automation, and have the ability to 
immediately override any decisions deemed unsafe.  A computer is very accurate, but a 
human is able to maintain awareness of the “big picture” and is also capable of predictive 
modeling and rapid pattern recognition that a computer simply cannot.  When employing 
automation, the designer and aircrew must look at the characteristics of the decision to be 
made and weigh the advantages of both humans and computers.  In Table 1, a model for 
doing so is provided. 
  Another potential pitfall of automation is the removal of the pilot from “the loop”.  
If the aircrew are not actively involved in the operation of the aircraft, then complacency 
and disinterest could beget different failures:  the development of automation has resulted 
in a shift from errors resulting from commission errors (an operator's action evolves into 
a problem) to those resulting from omission errors (the operator fails to recognize a 
problem) (Sarter & Woods, 1995).  Checking for untoward events that rarely occur is a 
vigilance task, at which humans are notoriously poor.   (Loukopoulos, et al. 2003). 
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Table 1 
Decision Characterization Matrix 
 HUMAN COMPUTER
Set, predictable, constant conditions 
Amount of Repetition 
How time critical 
Precision AND Complexity required (i.e. fuel metering) 
Mathematical/Algebraic content  
LESS MORE 
   
Amount of Prediction required 
Pattern recognition required 
Safety Impact/Consequences 
Future Impact/Additional decisions required as a result 
MORE LESS 
 
 
 
So the problem then becomes how to keep the aircrew aware of the decision making 
occurring, but not require exceptional mental processing.   
Of course, another consideration is the requirement for the human to be able to 
interrupt and override the automated decisions.  There are cases where it is simply 
impossible for a human to perform a computer’s task, such as the flight control 
computers of an unstable airplane like the X-31 (Friehmelt, 2002).  But when possible, 
the aircrew must be kept subtly informed and capable of reversing any inappropriate 
decisions.  Correctly applied, computers and the capability they bring to relieve aircrew 
workload are a boon to aviation. 
 The modern cockpit is certainly a daunting environment, but through intelligent 
application of the aforementioned principles it can become more intuitive, safer and more 
productive than was ever possible before the microcomputer.  The challenge lies in that 
intelligent application.  The organization of the displays and controls should be carefully 
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analyzed, as poor organization can substantially increase cognitive workload and reaction 
times for a given procedure.  Although aircrew cannot immediately rectify problems, this 
analysis can direct training efforts to areas of expected difficulty.  The presentation of 
data must be avoided.  Although this sounds contradictory, it is information that should 
be provided to the aircrew.  The less mental correlation or imaging required of a pilot, the 
better.  Information, if presented in a manner that is easily interpreted, supports rapid and 
accurate decision making without the need for the aircrew to mentally assemble discrete 
bits of data into an overall picture.  In an effort to support easy interpretation, the format 
of the information must be selected based upon its content.  Visual, auditory and tactile 
mediums are possible, with the visual medium predominating.  However, because certain 
items of information readily adapt to auditory presentation, aircrew can expect future 
designs to relieve some of the visual workload of the modern cockpit.  All of this, and a 
great deal more, must be considered when assembling a team in this very compact 
information and control center, the cockpit.  When thoughtfully applied, these principles 
will lead to a safer and more productive flight deck, enhancing the crew’s ability to reach 
the same state of situational awareness. 
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5.  CREW INTERACTION SKILLS 
 
 With knowledge of how an individual gains awareness in the pursuit of effective 
and safe decisions, and how the mechanical systems in the cockpit support this effort, the 
next objective is to improve the efficacy of the process of exchanging information 
between members of the team when making joint decisions – Team Decision Making.  
Every human interprets the world differently, as previously discussed, and the once an 
individual has reached awareness of a situation, the next effort is to reconcile that view of 
events with the other team members.  There are many methods for accomplishing this, 
but for simplicity, the four remaining Navy CRM skills will be examined:  
Communication, Leadership, Assertiveness and Mission Analysis.  A synopsis of the 
meaning of each term follows: 
 
Communication      -----    Being understood 
Leadership      -----    Breaking down barriers 
Assertiveness      -----    Being heard 
Mission Analysis     -----    Team goal setting 
 
Each of these terms reflects a different method of relating to other team members.  All 
are important.  Through the use of these skills, the flight crew can promote a 
commonality of awareness among the team.   
In figure 6, a visual model of the team decision making process is shown.  The 
illustration assumes that two individuals are exposed to the same environment, but  
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Figure 6 
Graphical Model of Crew Interaction 
(Author) 
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through factors such as the “POP” phenomenon, their respective opinion, or “SA”, of the 
situation is disparate (shown through the use of differing colors for each decision-making 
cycle).  The skills of communication, leadership, assertiveness and mission analysis, 
however, allow the two crewmembers to reach agreement on the situation and reach a 
consensus on action to be taken.  With the execution of their decision, the environment 
changes, feedback occurs, the two individuals interpret this according to their own 
idiosyncrasies, and the process begins again.   
5.1  Communication  
The most important feature of a functioning crew is communication.  It is the 
bedrock of all of the processes that follow.  It is primarily verbal, although it may occur 
in any form including physical, visual, and even through prior common experience (such 
as the statement “same as last time”).  Although communication seems a simple concept, 
there is significant complexity to it.  For anyone who has tried to use hand signals to 
convey complex information, or even just played a game of charades, the challenge of 
communication becomes immediately apparent.  Verbal, physical, or other exchanges 
cannot always be treated as communication.  For communication to occur, there must be 
receipt of the sender’s information.  Herein lies the difficulty in achieving effective 
communication – determining if the receiver understood the intended message.  If this is 
not the case, there are several possible levels of mis-communication, listed and described 
below: 
Effective Communication – both sender and receiver are adept and message is effectively 
received. 
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Ineffective Communication – either sender or receiver is not adept at conveying or 
interpreting the message and this is recognized. 
“I don’t understand”, despite the efforts of both parties, cultural or conditional 
differences prevent reaching a mutual and correct level of situational awareness. 
False Communication – sender thinks it effective when it is not, receiver is aware of 
deficiency but does not inform sender. 
Such as a timid subordinate under an oppressive boss, unwilling to seem 
incompetent by requiring amplification of the message. 
Deceptive Communication – both sender and receiver feel that effective communication 
has occurred, but receiver misinterprets message and is acting on incorrect assumptions. 
  
Of these four possibilities, deceptive communication is potentially the most 
harmful.  Because both parties are content, there are no warning flags regarding the 
misunderstanding.  An example of deceptive communication occurred in March of 2002 
when a Gulfstream II was inbound to San Francisco International (NASA, 2003).  The 
controller cleared the crew for a “Tiptoe Visual Approach” which the first officer read 
back to the controller.  The captain, however, understood and began to execute a visual 
approach – ignoring the restrictions of the “Tiptoe Visual” approach.  This caused a 
traffic conflict and resulted in the Gulfstream being waved off during the approach.  The 
approach controller was probably surprised to see the Gulfstream deviate from assigned 
track, since the first officer had correctly read back the “Tiptoe Visual” instructions.  The 
captain obviously understood the clearance to mean “own navigation”, despite an 
admonition from the first officer, who recognized the disparity in awareness.   
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The question, then, is: who is responsible for effective communication?  The 
sender is ultimately required to ensure effective communication.  Only the sender can 
determine if the intended message was conveyed, and even that is difficult.  The 
communication method of using negative statements often leads to deceptive 
communication.  Aviation is rife with examples where statements such as “do not 
descend” are heard as “descend!”  This is the purpose of a readback, as this permits the 
sender an opportunity to verify the instruction was received correctly, but often a 
readback is skipped or becomes “roger.”  In August of 2002, a Cessna 177 pilot was 
instructed to “hold at the hold line, [do not] taxi into position and hold” in Oakland, 
California (NASA, 2003).  The pilot, hearing the words “position and hold”, “rogered the 
transmission” and continued onto the runway.  The tower controller asked the Cessna to 
immediately exit the runway, and fortunately no conflict occurred.  This example serves 
to accentuate the purpose of a readback of an instruction: to automatically provide a 
sender the opportunity to check the receiver’s interpretation of the message. 
Often, communication is hampered by the sender.  When seeking information, 
many people tend to state their desired answer in the form of a question.  This is 
sometimes referred to as a “leading question”.  Leading questions can deny the responder 
an opportunity to objectively analyze a situation, especially in confusing or pressured 
environments.  A subordinate who subconsciously is attempting to placate a superior is 
given the desired outcome, often enticing the subordinate to agree with the superior’s 
position in an effort to avoid confrontation.  To avoid this, questions should be stated as 
objectively as possible, and should not include any elements of the questioner’s 
assessment of the environment.  Instead of “I’m pretty sure it’s that right engine that’s 
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giving us trouble, don’t you think?” or even “Is the right engine the malfunctioning one?” 
a better question would be “What is your assessment of the engine trouble?”  Of course, 
even this implies that the engine is at fault, and so perhaps a question such as “What is 
causing that vibration?” is most appropriate, for this question includes only a fact that 
should be recognizable by the receiver – that the aircraft is vibrating.  When 
communicating through questions, the construction of the question is of critical 
importance in order to avoid coloring the receiver’s opinion of the situation. 
5.2  Leadership  
Leadership is the ability of an individual to break down the barriers that prevent 
effective communication, to allow and encourage individuals to function as a part of the 
team and to share their level of awareness.  In aviation, leadership is typically dictated.  
Historically, the judgment of the captain was considered sacrosanct, and he was the final 
authority on all matters.  Several historical aviation accidents proved that the aircraft 
captain was not always perfect (although traditionally the captain was infallible).   The 
responsibility of perfection should never have been placed on a single person, as the 
resulting power (authority) gradient in the cockpit often made the opinions of lesser 
crewmembers insignificant.  Over time, the power gradient in the cockpit has been 
reduced somewhat, and this is a good thing.  In some cultures, however, there still exists 
a strong respect for authority and significant hesitation to question one of higher position.  
The problem of a leader is how to maintain authority without dominating the 
environment and quelling the opinions and suggestions of those “lesser” persons who 
also are part of the crew.   
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The amount of leadership required is dependent on the environment.  Under most 
modern operating conditions, leadership is not a critical feature of an aircrew.  This is 
because modern flight operations have been sufficiently designed so that each member 
knows their role, discharges it effectively, and communicates necessary information 
effectively.  In unusual circumstances, though, the need for leadership is significantly 
great.  Too, when the job is such that individuals are so undertasked that simply 
remaining awake is a challenge, leadership is also of great benefit.  Figure 7 illustrates 
the times when leadership is most critical: when things are not going as planned.  Here, 
communication tends to break down, and individuals are less sure of their roles and 
responsibilities since these situations are not encountered as often.  In this instance, a 
leadership role is necessary to facilitate and encourage communication and to keep  
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crewmembers focused on the task at hand.  In some cases, unwilling or unsuspecting 
people will possess necessary information, and a leader must recognize their ability to 
contribute to awareness and then encourage their participation.  Perhaps a passenger 
witnessed the failure of an engine – although not a traditional member of the flightcrew, 
the passenger has critical information that could aid the SA of the crew, and the leader of 
the crew must recognize this and solicit input.   
 During one of the author’s air combat training flights, substantial confusion 
existed after an engagement between a flight of F/A-18 Hornets and F-16 Falcons.  The 
author, in a two-seat F/A-18, turned to leave the area of the engagement when another 
flight suddenly appeared nearby on the radar screen.  Unsure whether this contact was 
friendly F/A-18s or “enemy” F-16s, the author asked a ground-based controller to 
identify the contact, but the controller was unable to do so.  Now, the author and his 
wingman were unsure of what to do, and were pressured to decide quickly on a course of 
action due to the close proximity of the unknown contact.  At this point, the flight was 
towards the right side of the graph in figure 7.  With a single codeword, though, the 
author’s backseater was able to take a leadership role in the situation and immediately 
resolve the entire flight’s situational awareness.  He simply said “VID”, which stands for 
Visual Identification, and the roles of everyone in this scenario were well known by all 
four aircrew in the flight.  With a single codeword, the author’s backseater had defined 
the scenario – which was that the flight would visually identify the contact by passing 
close by – and assigned roles to all members – which were defined by doctrine and 
training.  The flight successfully completed the VID and was able to effectively engage 
what turned out to be a pair of “enemy” F-16s.   
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5.3 Assertiveness 
It is important that individuals be willing to contribute to the collective awareness 
of the crew.  Too, the team must be willing to accept the information offered.  In 
instances where the leader may be preoccupied or even unwilling to consider a 
colleague’s opinion, then it is necessary for that individual to be assertive.  Assertiveness 
is not always aggressiveness.  It may involve an alternate approach such as a diplomatic 
request for information, forcing the team to consider the state of their knowledge and 
awareness at the time.  At times, aggressiveness may be required, but the method of 
presentation is very dependent on the personality of the other team members.   
Under high levels of stress, when the impact of a decision is particularly 
consequential, there may be a tendency for crewmembers to transfer responsibility for the 
decision to either the senior individual or the person making the decision.  Incidents such 
as the holocaust can be attributed to the transference of responsibility for the 
consequences to the accepted authority figure.  Although crewmembers may disagree 
with a proposed course of action, if there is interpersonal conflict or even if despair 
exists, then that individual may relinquish liability for the actions of the crew, cease 
participating in decision making, and emotionally absolve themself of culpability for the 
outcome.  The potential danger of this phenomenon is obvious – a critical crewmember 
may cease to be an effective member of the team during times of high crisis.   
 The Federal Aviation Administration offers guidance on assertiveness, but 
includes inquiry and advocacy as related concepts.  The following is from Advisory 
Circular 120-51E, “Crew Resource Management Training”: 
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Inquiry/Advocacy/Assertion. These behaviors relate to crewmembers promoting the 
course of action that they feel is best, even when it involves conflict with others. 
Behavioral Markers:  
(1) Crewmembers speak up and state their information with appropriate 
persistence until there is some clear resolution.  
(2) “Challenge and response” environment is developed.  
(3) Questions are encouraged and are answered openly and 
nondefensively.  
(4) Crewmembers are encouraged to question the actions and decisions of 
others.  
(5) Crewmembers seek help from others when necessary.  
(6) Crewmembers question status and programming of automated systems to 
confirm situation awareness.  (FAA, 2004) 
 
 An excellent method of being assertive without confrontation is to ask questions 
of another crewmember.  If an intellectually subordinate position is taken, such as stating 
“I don’t understand the problem” or “I’m not as proficient as you, could you please 
explain your gameplan?” then the obstinate individual will be forced to mentally evaluate 
his or her awareness of the situation in order to answer the question.  The colloquial 
saying “you never realize how little you know until you attempt to teach the subject” is 
the goal of this approach – to place the isolationist individual in an intellectually superior 
position, that of an instructor, and to force that individual to make a thorough assessment 
of their awareness as they attempt to convey it.  An excellent example of this principle is 
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related by Air Force Major Bernard Mater, where his persistent questions, from an 
intellectually inferior position, avert a flight deck-fire during C-130 operations in Alaska 
(Mater, 2002).  The crew were all experienced on the C-130, and reasoned slightly low 
engine power to the age of the aircraft, but Major Mater’s questions led to an in-flight 
analysis that uncovered a severe bleed-air leak underneath the cockpit!  Another option is 
to demand “what are you doing?” but this places the same individual in an intellectually 
and authoritatively inferior position, one of being asked to account for actions that the 
other crewmember apparently deems inappropriate.  This will often alienate someone 
who is already uninterested in serving as a contributor to team awareness and decisions. 
 Perhaps the best known example of a lack of assertiveness is the tragedy at the 
Los Rodeos airport on Tenerife Island, on March 27, 1977 (ASN, 2003).  The airport at 
Tenerife was clogged with aircraft diverted due to a bomb explosion in the terminal of 
Los Palmas Airport, and many were waiting to be allowed to continue to the destination.  
One aircraft, a KLM 747, was anxious to leave as the crew were approaching the limit of 
their authorized duty day.  The captain onboard the KLM aircraft was the most senior 
pilot in the company.  As soon as emergency in Los Palmas was resolved, most of the 
diverted aircraft began to depart, while the KLM crew called for additional fuel.  While 
they refueled, a Pan Am 747 was trapped on the ramp by the KLM aircraft.  Once 
refueling was completed, the KLM began to taxi, with the Pan Am close behind.  
Because of the congestion on the ramp, departing aircraft were required to back-taxi 
several thousand feet down the active runway, and then turn onto a parallel taxiway to 
clear the runway for aircraft ahead in the sequence.  On this day, the KLM reached the 
end of the runway first, and was preparing to takeoff.  Simultaneously, the Pan Am 747 
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was still back-taxiing, not yet clear of the runway.  Fog had developed, and although 
patchy, it obscured the aircraft on the runway, preventing the tower from seeing the 
aircraft or the aircraft from seeing each other.  The captain of the KLM 747, tired of 
waiting, instructed his first officer to call for takeoff.  As he was doing so, the captain 
began the takeoff roll.  The tower instructed the KLM flight that he “would call them for 
takeoff.”  A discussion ensued on the KLM flight deck, with both the first officer and the 
flight engineer expressing concern that they were, in fact, not cleared for takeoff.  No one 
expressly disagreed, however, and the takeoff continued. 
 Meanwhile, the Pan Am 747 had reached the midpoint of the runway, and was 
having difficulty finding the assigned taxiway to turn off on.  The crew had been listening 
to the KLM’s conversation with the tower, and as the KLM 747 accelerated, the first 
officer onboard announced over tower frequency “we are at takeoff.”  The Pan Am crew 
immediately realized the conflict, and transmitted that they were still on the runway.  
Unfortunately, tower made a similar transmission at the exact same time as the Pan Am 
aircraft, producing a loud squeal in the cockpit of the KLM aircraft (although the 
transmissions were still audible on the CVR).  The crew of the Pan Am 747 added power 
and began a desperate attempt to turn and get clear of the runway.  Seconds later, before 
the Pan Am could leave the runway, the KLM 747 appeared out of the mist, trying in 
vain to get airborne as the KLM crew suddenly saw the gravity of the mistake.  The KLM 
747 became airborne, but then slammed into the midsection of the Pan Am 747, killing 
574 persons in the impact and ensuing fire (see figure 8). 
 Onboard the KLM 747, the first officer and the flight engineer attempted to be 
assertive, using the both inquiry and advocacy, but both stopped short of direct and  
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Figure 8 
Remains of 747 at Tenerife 
(Unknown, http://www.airdisaster.com/photos/) 
 
 
aggressive confrontation with the captain.  The first officer asked questions such as “Is he 
not clear then?” in regards to the Pan Am aircraft.  When the KLM 747 captain began to 
takeoff, however, neither continued the challenge.  Instead, the first officer began to 
attempt other techniques to mitigate the danger, but these were unsuccessful and the 
greatest aviation disaster prior to September 11, 2001 resulted. 
5.4  Mission Analysis and Team Goal Setting 
 Mission analysis occurs on two levels – first, each individual determines what 
their impression of the mission is, and in doing so provides a model that begets 
situational awareness.  Secondly, the team shares among its members these goals, with 
the elected leader determining which is the correct course of action.  The first level must 
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occur, while the second, group sharing only occurs with healthy teams.  As such, all 
teams should strive to share the member’s visions of goals, while recognizing that there 
must be the ability for a recognized leader to focus the team on a common, understood 
objective.  Mission analysis should also occur at different times.  For common operations, 
there should a definition of goals prior to the execution of a task.  This is simply 
planning, but objectives must be included in the plan.  As the task progresses and 
develops, re-assessment is required to ensure the continued relevance of the mission 
statements and to account for any substantial changes that might redirect the entire effort.  
If an F/A-18 is on a mission to destroy an enemy weapons plant, but is then hit by anti-
aircraft fire, the mission will likely radically change to safely recovering the damaged 
airplane. 
 Within the task of setting realistic goals for the team is the need to identify the 
expected contributions of each person involved.  In many cases, the distribution of duties 
is defined by standard operating procedures or acknowledged standards, but in unusual 
situations, the team leader may need to be directive to avoid confusion.  In cases where 
roles and responsibilities are institutionalized, deceptive communication is a threat where 
a crewmember, instructed to perform a given procedure, may agree to participate without 
fully understanding the contribution expected of him or her.  In all cases, the benefit of a 
common goal should not be discounted: 
 
Common Goals are also important for safety, since it is assumed that humans 
have a survival instinct that drives them to access whatever resources possible – 
beyond any predefined rules – in order to stay alive.  (Kaliardos, 1999) 
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The leader must also be responsible when defining the mission for the crew.  
There are certainly many examples of irresponsible mission analysis.  Flathatting, 
unauthorized aerobatics, sightseeing, buzzing and many more pitfalls have resulted in the 
loss of thousands of lives.  Unfortunately, the trend will continue.  Essentially, these 
mishaps are the result of poor mission analysis on the part of the crew and typically are a 
single person’s agenda vice the objective of the crew.  A well documented case of this 
rogue mentality is the loss of a B-52H at Fairchild Air Force Base on the 24th of June, 
1994.  In this instance, a senior, experienced pilot in the aircraft flew the plane well 
beyond established limits under the direct supervision of other senior, knowledgeable 
aircrew.  The mission of the flight was to demonstrate capabilities of the B-52 during an 
upcoming air show, but LtCol Holland apparently had an independent agenda with the 
intent to perform impressive, yet unauthorized, maneuvers.  His propensity for pursuing 
individual goals, despite actual opposition from his crew, had existed and been verbally 
addressed for several years, but no significant action was taken against him.  Many junior 
aircrew refused to fly with him, due to past air show performances and a flight performed 
for a journalist crew where, under protest from all onboard, he flew a B-52 across a 
ridgeline a approximately 30 feet.  A few minutes later, he repeated the performance, but 
in this case was so low that the camera crew abandoned their equipment as the airplane 
passed by – at an estimated three feet above terrain.  This was done strictly for personal 
reasons, as no legitimate mission, training or otherwise, would include flying a B-52 at 
three feet.  This attitude was likely the one that drove LtCol Holland, while practicing for 
an upcoming air show, to place the B-52 in an impressive attitude – but one that proved 
unrecoverable and ultimately fatal to the four senior aviators onboard (figure 9).  Here, a  
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Figure 9 
Crash of B-52 at Fairchild AFB 
(Unknown, http://www.airdisaster.com/photos/) 
 
 
misguided mission analysis – the desire by LtCol Holland to perform maneuvers thought 
impossible (which, in fact, were) – resulted in the loss of the aircraft and four valuable 
personnel. 
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6.  SUMMARY 
 
The entire process of risk management can be summed up as: 
Anticipate   the hazards  
then… 
Participate  in their mitigation 
always... 
“Share” your “Aware”-ness 
This seems a bit of an understatement, but it effectively captures all of the principles 
presented in this paper.  Operational Risk Management is the detailed combination of 
these simple principles.  Risk planning is effective anticipation of the potential hazards, 
while Team Decision Making requires the participation of persons involved to help make 
safe decisions and to avoid critical errors.  All crewmembers must share their opinion of 
the situation to truly build a team level of situational awareness.  “Information is power, 
but it is pointless power if hoarded.  Power must be shared…” (DePree, 1989). 
 The physical systems present on most modern aircraft promise a revolution in 
decision making, however, the careless application of technology can impede situational 
awareness.  The tendency to apply technology to traditional information techniques and 
the trend towards the presentation of data, vice much more useful information, can cause 
disparate states of awareness between members of a crew.  Each individual member of an 
aviation team will progress through the decision-making cycle independently, unless 
efforts are made to reconcile the situational awareness of all participants.  In doing so, the 
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fact that no two humans will interpret a situation identically must be considered.  Each 
individual will form a different opinion of the situation due to the “POP” phenomenon.  
Once a team has accepted this fact, then the application of the principles of 
communication, leadership, assertiveness, and mission analysis will allow the exchange 
of awareness among crewmembers.  Ultimately, the goal is to reach a common situational 
awareness for all team members.  If this is accomplished, due to regulations and training 
a consensus on action can typically be reached.  Once a course of action is elected and 
carried out, then the cycle repeats, continuously. 
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7.  ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS USING THE “SADCLAM” METHOD 
Fortunately, the SADCLAM model of cockpit decision making also serves as a 
tool for constructive analysis of events ex post facto.  Because this model determines all 
of the information fed into the cockpit, the decision can be reversed and analyzed in 
respect to the information that led to its execution.  To do so is very simple.  The decision 
in question becomes the starting point, and the individual who ultimately made the 
decision final.  There may be no apparent mistake – if a missile shot down the aircraft, 
then the missile was obviously responsible for the aircraft’s demise.  However, a series of 
decisions led to the aircraft being placed in harm’s way, and those decisions can be 
analyzed using this model.  This technique can, in fact, be applied to any decision in any 
respect, as all decisions in life are based on some level of situational awareness.  The 
critical question is: “What was the situational awareness of the person or persons at the 
time the decision was made?”  From this point, all of the events leading up to the critical 
point must be included in the analysis.  A poor decision rarely happens spontaneously – 
many events must normally conspire to cause accidents in aviation. 
To analyze a mishap using the SADCLAM method, begin by determining who 
made the decision under scrutiny.  Analyze what the situational awareness of that person 
was at the time of the decision.  Compile a list of the information that would be necessary 
for an average person to make a safe, effective decision in the same circumstances.  
Compare that list with the information available to the person or crew in question.  Most 
importantly, attempt to evaluate each person’s actual interpretation of every element of 
required information.  This will be challenging, as the particular prejudices of each 
72 
 
 
individual will be difficult to determine, but research the history of them and conduct 
interviews with friends and family, if possible.  This will help to determine the mindset 
and likely dispositions of the individual.   
7.1 Example of Incident Analysis using TDM Principles 
 An example is the best method of illustrating this process.  One of the most 
distressing instances of a failure in Team Decision Making is the loss of a British 
Midland Airways Boeing 737-400 on January 8, 1989 at the East Midlands Airport in 
England.  The mishap was tragic in the fact that although the 737 had suffered an engine 
failure in-flight, the remaining engine, although functional, was shut down due to a 
misdiagnosis of the problem.  While on final approach to an emergency landing, the 
previously damaged engine failed completely, without sufficient time or altitude to effect 
a restart of the good motor.  This begs the question: how could such a massive error occur 
unchecked? 
 As with most mishaps, the end result was the product of a chain of events leading 
to the final, fatal outcome.  The decisions made throughout the flight were, as all 
decisions are, made according to the situational awareness of the persons involved.  What 
remains distressing is the fact that sufficient information was available to the aircrew to 
establish “correct” situational awareness.  Unfortunately, they did not, and thus provided 
an excellent example of multiple failures of effective Team Decision Making.  A 
narrative of the mishap is appropriate, to illustrate the predicament and actions of those 
involved before attempting an analysis: 
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 On the evening of Sunday the 8th of January, 1989, British Midlands flight 092 
took off from London’s Heathrow airport bound for Belfast.  During the climbout, while 
passing Flight Level 283 (28,300 feet), the aircraft experienced a series of engine stalls 
on the port motor, with flight attendants and passengers seeing “sparks”, “flames” and 
“torching” produced by the left-hand, No. 1 engine.  The aircrew on the flight deck could 
not see the visual indications of the engine problems, but were aware of airframe 
vibrations and could then smell, along with the other occupants of the aircraft, a scent of 
something burning.  A light smoke began to invade the cabin through the air-conditioning 
ducting also.  Immediately the pilots began an attempt to identify the problem. 
 When the aircrew scanned the engine instruments, they appeared to be normal.  
The captain, based on his training and own understanding of the aircraft’s air 
conditioning system, assumed that the right engine was the culprit.  He then queried the 
first officer regarding the instrument indications of trouble, to which the first officer 
hesitantly responded that the right engine appeared to be the abnormal one.  With his 
suspicions thus confirmed, the captain directed the right engine to be throttled back.   The 
crew were now actively involved in the navigation of the aircraft to a suitable divert 
airfield, and while doing so, the first officer began the shutdown procedures for the right 
motor.  The captain, focused on the decisions and communication to reroute the airliner, 
did not questions these actions – which is unremarkable, as his SA was that the degraded 
engine was being shutdown. 
 Since the selected divert airfield of East Midlands was nearby, a rapid descent 
was necessary.  To facilitate this, the left engine was reduced to idle power.  Although 
this was, in fact, the malfunctioning engine, at idle power settings the discrepancies were 
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nearly undetectable.  A slight rise in Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) had occurred on 
this engine, of approximately 50 degrees, but since this would have been well below 
maximum EGT (at idle power) this would be easy to overlook.  The only other 
substantial indicator was the engine vibration value, which was radically higher than 
normal.  Unfortunately, this instrument reading was overlooked by both crewmembers.  
After the right engine was secured, the captain made a Public Address announcement to 
the passengers that there was a “problem with the right engine” and that it had been 
shutdown.  Apparently, this statement did not register concern among the flight 
attendants or the passengers who had seen the fireballs emanating from the left engine, or 
perhaps these individuals felt that the crew was obviously better informed than they were 
and that the aircrew’s decisions were correct regardless of what had been seen from the 
cabin. 
 With the good engine now secured and the failing one operating at flight idle, the 
crew descended and prepared the 737 for a straight-in approach to East Midlands Airport.  
During the descent, the captain began to review the decision to secure the right-hand 
motor.  As he began to verbalize the indications he and the first officer had responded to, 
the discourse was interrupted by air traffic control providing vectors, a further descent, 
and a frequency change to approach control.  After switching frequencies, the first officer 
began reading the One Engine Inoperative Descent and Approach checklists.  These, in 
turn, were interrupted by additional transmissions from approach control.  The approach 
checklists were not completed until the 737 was 15 nautical miles (nm) from the runway 
and passing 6,500 feet.  Approaching 3,000 feet it was, of course, necessary to reduce the 
rate of descent by increasing engine power on the one remaining motor.  As the power 
75 
 
 
was increased on the No. 1 engine, the vibration reading again spiked to the maximum 
value.   
 Continuing the descent and decelerating in preparation for landing, the crew 
began to realize that the left motor was not completely healthy.  As the power was 
advanced on the remaining engine, the vibrations began again and the engine began to 
stall.  The first officer initialized the restart procedures for the operable right motor, but 
before the engine could be brought to starting speed, the left motor catastrophically 
failed.  Now below the minimum airspeed required for an airstart, the 737 was doomed to 
landing immediately – in this case, just short of the runway at East Midlands.  In the 
ensuing impact with trees and a motorway, the aircraft broke apart as it plunged into an 
embankment, killing 39 persons at impact (figure 10).  Eight more later perished due to 
injuries sustained in the crash.  The cause of the left engine’s failure was traced to a 
vibration-fatigue failure of the fan blades of the SNECMA motors of the Boeing 737-400.  
Under the specific conditions of climb power and pressure altitudes of 25,000 – 30,000 
feet, the vibration became severe enough to result in fan blade failures.  The right engine 
had suffered no damage. 
The question, in hindsight, is simple:  “How could a trained cockpit crew shut 
down the incorrect motor?”  To answer this using the SADCLAM method of analysis, it 
is necessary to begin at the tragic end and work backwards to the critical decision that 
ultimately cost 47 people their lives.  Obviously, the engine-less landing occurred 
because the operable motor was shut down and not restarted while reliance was placed on 
the failing motor.  The fact that the good engine was not restarted earlier can be attributed 
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Figure 10 
Aftermath of British Midlands Flight 092 
(Unknown, http://www.airdisaster.com/photos/) 
 
 
to the SA of the aircrew.  They were convinced that the situation was reversed and 
unfortunately, had no additional reason or information to make them doubt their decision 
– until the engine they were relying on failed.  Sadly, there was a different level of 
awareness among the cabin crew and the passengers on the aircraft.  So what led the 
aircrew to shut down the wrong engine? 
 Of course, the captain would not have intentionally ordered the good engine 
secured, so his SA must have been incorrect.  There were several contributors to the 
captain’s SA: 
a. Based on his statements, his training led him to conclude that cabin air was 
primarily supplied by the right engine.  When smoke began entering the cabin, 
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this led him to suspect the right engine as the culprit.  Actually, engine bleed 
air from both motors supplies cabin air conditioning, but the captain’s 
misconception due to past experience and biases caused his SA to be 
otherwise.  When power was reduced on the right motor, the smoke abated, 
but shortly thereafter power was actually reduced on both engines.  Thus, the 
captain’s SA was not contradicted. 
b. There were no apparent indications of failure on the engine instruments.  
Actually, the EGT of the left motor rose significantly, but this was missed by 
both aircrew.  The engine vibration value for the left engine, however, was 
well above that of the right – at the maximum value at the time of the initial 
and final failures.  The captain had learned to distrust the engine vibration 
indications though, as his previous experience with these instruments led him 
to deem them unreliable and misleading.  These indicators were considerably 
advanced in comparison to the systems the captain had experience with, 
though, and were the primary instruments used to diagnose an identical fan 
blade failure on another 737-400 just five months after this incident. 
c. When the captain consulted the first officer regarding his opinion, the CVR 
recorded a momentary hesitation on the part of the first officer, who then 
agreed with the captain that the right motor was malfunctioning.  Once the 
first officer reversed his decision and concurred with the captain’s analysis, no 
other contradicting information was recognized or accepted by the flight deck 
crew. 
78 
 
 
d. It seems that the captain might have been uneasy about the choice of which 
motor to shut down, as he began a review of the indications and assumptions 
made by the aircrew at the onset of the emergency.  Unfortunately, this 
analysis was interrupted by communications and it was never logically 
completed.  Perhaps there was a bit of “sixth sense” concern by the captain. 
e. The captain did a poor job of managing his team, in that he limited his SA 
when communicating with the cabin crew.  Instead of asking what the SA of 
the senior flight attendant was, he simply queried “Did you get smoke in the 
cabin?” to which the flight attendant replied “We did, yes.”  Had the captain 
asked “Any idea what’s going on?” he most likely would have received a 
comment regarding not only the smoke in the cabin but also the flames and 
sparks out of the left engine.     
But what of the awareness of the team?   
a. Based on the first officer’s hesitation when answering the captain’s question 
of which engine had failed, it is possible that he was not entirely confident of 
his assessment.  He did not, however, question the analysis after this, and he 
actually began the shutdown procedures without direction from the captain.  
So, if doubt did exist for the first officer, it was apparently removed when the 
captain concurred with his interpretation of the failure, and his SA matched 
that of the captain’s throughout the remainder of the flight. 
b. The cabin crew were most likely aware of the health of the left motor.   
c. The passengers, especially those seated at windows near the left engine, 
certainly had significant awareness of the predicament.   
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In this case, though, the awareness of the whole team was not reconciled with that of the 
cockpit crew.  Leading questions prevented critical information from reaching the 
captain, and had the first officer been more assertive when he initially seemed unsure of 
the diagnosis, perhaps the captain would have been less confident of his assessment.  The 
training of the captain was a factor, since his SA was heavily dependent on it, but this 
analysis did not seem to be sufficiently conveyed to the team, and his past experience 
colored his perceptions of the problem.   
 In any aviation mishap, a multitude of factors is responsible.  There are typically 
several critical links that could prevent the occurrence.  The danger lies when those links 
go unnoticed, and the purpose of Team Decision Making is to aid the team in recognizing 
those links.  This is done by sharing the awareness of all the possible contributing 
members, and then deciding on the most correct assessment of the situation.  Hopefully, 
through education of effective methods of doing so, such as TDM, future aviation 
mishaps can be averted. 
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MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER/ATTACK SQUADRON 121 RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
DATE: 16 MAR 04 
  
EVENT: 04 
 
AIRCREW:   
                 
48HRS A/C STATUS YES NO LGB DELIVERY YES NO FLIGHT BRF 
UNIT TRANSITION CONDITION YELLOW NORMAL DO UP GRIPES AFFECT MISSION M L MIDAIR/CFIT BRF L M                                               YES                NO         CHANGED 
TRANSITION OPS IN LAST 14 DAYS   ASSYMETRIC LOAD M L DELIVERY APPROP. FOR WX/WPN L H FLT SCHEDULED L M M 
  JOINT/COMBINED M   LOAD IN ACCORDANCE WITH VOL IV L H DESIGNATOR BRF L E DELAYED> 4 HRS M L   
  OUTSIDE AGENCY M   LAUNCH/RECOVERY YES NO RANGE APPROPRIATE L E WEATHER  VMC >MINS <MINS
MISSION PLANNING TIME 8-12 HRS < 8 HRS T/O PLAN APPROP. FOR WX L E A/C CURRENT FOR WPN L M   LAUNCH L L H 
  MAGTF M H RNDZ PLAN APPROPRIATE FOR WX L E NIGHT SYSTEMS YES NO   ENROUTE L L M 
  JOINT/COMBINED M H LOST SIGHT/NO RADAR PLAN L H NVG TRNG RULES BRF L H   OP AREA L M M 
  OUTSIDE AGENCY M H PERF. NUMBERS BRF  L H NVG ILLUSION/SPATIAL D BRF L H   RECOVER L L H 
MISSION TYPE TAC TRNG CNTNGNT RALT PLAN BRF L H A/C LIGHTS BRF L H CONDITIONS  LIGHT MOD SEVERE
  IN HOUSE L M SUITABLE APPRCH AVAIL. L H WX APPROPRIATE L H   ICING M H E 
  MAGTF L M VASI/PAPI/OLS AVAIL. L M SENSOR USAGE BRF L H   TURB. L L M 
  JOINT COMBINED M M ARRESTING GEAR AVAIL. L M RALT PLAN IAW SOP L H   T-STORM L L H 
  OUTSIDE AGENCY M H BIRD CONDITION OTHER THAN LT. M L LIGHT LEVEL IAW SOP L M WATER/AIR TEMP/SEA STATE <NATOPS >NATOPS 
PILOT T&R PROFICIENT NO   TRANSIT YES NO A/C NSQ OR SYLLABUS L H    L M
  CURRENT M   FORM APPROP. WX L M LOW ALT AREAS CHUM L H AIRCRAFT STATUS NO FCF FCF   
  PREREQ MET M   ANTI-EXPOSURE SUIT REQ. M L LOW ALT AREA FAMILIAR L H    L M   
CURRENCY     CONTROLLER LANGUAGE BARRIER  M L LOW ALT. TACTICS YES NO REVIEW 24HR ASSESSMENT     
  INSTRUMENT M   SOP FUEL REQ. MET L H WX & RALT PLAN IAW SOP L H   CMND RELATIONS M H 
  NATOPS M   MISSION INCLUDES DEMO/FLYBY H L TRNG RULES BRF L H OVERALL MISSION PLAN M H 
  NVG M   AIRSPACE    MANEUVER BRFD & UNDERSTOOD L H AIRCREW FACTORS M H 
FLIGHT CURRENCY > 30 DAYS   IFR L   LOW ALT AREA CHUM L H   CORE COMPETENT M H 
IN ACCORDANCE W/SOP M   VFR W/RADAR ADVISORY L   LOW ALT AREA FAMILIAR L H   T&R PROFICIENT M H 
48 HOUR RISK 
ASSESSMENT     L      M       H SCHEDULED MTR M   LAT APPROVED AIRSPACE L H   NAOPS/INST M H 
     VFR MUTUAL USE M   BASH IAW SOP M H   FLT CURRENT M H 
OPS REP SIGNATURE ____________________ UNCONTROLLED A/S H   CREW FLOWN IN < 30 DAYS M H   FLT DURATION M H 
         AERIAL REFUELING YES NO   CREW REST M H 
24 HOURS A/C DECONFLICTION BRF L H      PERSONAL FACTOR M H 
BRIEF BETWEEN 2400-0500L M   AR TRACK, COMM, RNDZ BRF L H      BRF TIME M H 
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PLANNED FLIGHT DURATION 3.0-5.0 > 5.0 VMC L M         
  IMC L M PLANNED FUEL > NON-EMERG DIV. L H         
  FORM L M DAY L M    24 HOUR REVIEW SIGNATURES 
  NVG M M PILOTS CURRENT ON PLATFORM L M    MSN RISK L M H E 
PERSONAL FACTORS MARGINAL SUSPECT AR TRACK ABOVE 5000AGL L M    
HEALTH M H AIR TO SURFACE YES NO    OPS REP SIGNATURE 
PERSONAL         L M TRAINING RULES BRF L H
COLLATERAL DUTY L M NVG TRAINING RULES BRF L H    DOSS REP SIGNATURE 
                            CREW REST 8 TO 9 < 8 FUZE/ORD RESTRICTIONS BRF L H     
  M H Z DIAGRAMS APPROPRIATE L H    CO SIGNATURE 
SPECIAL MISSION PLANNING RALT PLAN BRF L H           
AIRCRAFT STATUS M        H        E SENSOR USAGE BRF L H              
LAUNCH RECOVER M        H        E FAMILIAR RANGE L M         
TRANSIT M        H        E SOP CURRENCY L H    MISSION COMMANDER/FLT LEAD SIGNATURE 
AERIAL REFUEL M        H        E WX BETTER THAN MISSION MIN. L H         
AIR SURFACE M        H        E FRIENDLY POS. CLEAR L H    X 
AIR TO AIR M        H        E AIR TO AIR YES NO         
LGB DELIVERY M        H        E SOP CURRENCY L H         
NIGHT SYSTEM M        H        E WX APPROPRIATE FOR MISSION L H         
24 HOUR ASSESSMENT L        M        H        E TRAINING RULES BRF L H         
     SPINS REDUCE MID-AIR POTENTIAL L E         
     A/C LIGHTING/NVG RULES BRF L H         
     ACTI REQ. MET L H         
               SYLLABUS FLIGHT L M  
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